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The most recent wave of Islamic revivalism began in the second half of 
the twentieth century as a nonviolent movement of expressing ideological 
differences and discontent with the political, economic, and social condition 
among Muslims and inspired a reformation of the Muslim identity. Today, 
contemporary radical Islam, with militancy and terrorist tactics as its cornerstone, 
has all but overshadowed the call for a nonviolent struggle and has permeated 
several internal conflicts across the globe.   
The Muslim separatist movement in the southern Philippines is one such 
conflict.  Following decades of discontent and sporadic violence, conflict in the 
southern Philippines broke out in late 1972 when the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) launched coordinated attacks against the government.  Following a 
failed peace agreement in 1976, divisions began to form within the MNLF and in 
1984 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed. The MILF, as the 
name indicates, placed more emphasis on Islam.  In 1991, the radical group Abu 
Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword) broke off from the MNLF once again claiming 
disagreement with the peace process.  The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) stated its 
main purpose as being the establishment of an Islamic state, based on Islamic 
law (Shariah).   
By the mid-1990s, what had originated as a nationalistic struggle 
advocating the concept of the “Moro” identity, had evolved and produced two 
increasingly radical groups.  After conducting a diachronic comparative analysis, 
this thesis concludes contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines is a 
fusion of both traditionalism and globalization.  Furthermore, the causal factors 
evolved with respect to each group’s ideology, objectives, and tactics.  Whereas 
the MILF was more representative of the legacy of traditional Islam, the ASG was 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The most recent wave of Islamic revivalism began in the second half of 
the twentieth century as a nonviolent movement of expressing ideological 
differences and discontent with the political, economic, and social condition 
among Muslims and inspired a reformation of the Muslim identity.1 World events 
such as the Six-Day War in 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, the 1978 
Iranian Revolution, and the 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan significantly 
contributed to the mobilization, militarization, and eventual radicalization of the 
fundamentalist movement.2  Today, contemporary radical Islam3, with militancy 
and terrorist tactics as its cornerstone, has all but overshadowed the call for a 
nonviolent struggle and has permeated several internal conflicts across the 
globe. 
The Muslim separatist movement in the southern Philippines is one such 
conflict.  Following decades of discontent and sporadic violence, conflict in the 
southern Philippines broke out in late 1972 when the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) launched coordinated attacks against the government.4  Although 
its objective was to establish an independent state for all the Muslim peoples of 
the Philippines, the MNLF applied a broader concept of Philippine Muslim 
nationalism embodied in the “Moro” identity in order to have a more cultural-
                                            
1 Esposito, John L, Islam: The Straight Path, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 158, 160 & 
165. 
2 Further details available in Esposito, 160. and Sedgwick, Mark, “Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious 
Terrorism,”  Terrorism and Political Violence, (Winter 2004), 797. 
3 Contemporary radical Islam is also synonymously referred to as “radical Islamism,” “radical Islamist” 
or “Islamic militancy.”  And, for the purpose of this thesis, the definition of contemporary radical Islam is, as 
defined by Zachary Abuza; “[A movement whose ideology is] to establish an Islamic state governed by 
sharia through violence and extralegal means…”  Abuza, Zachary, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible 
of Terror, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 4. 
4 In 1912 the government sanctioned migration policies (northerners to the south) with the officially 
declared objective of increasing the production of agricultural crops by establishing vibrant small family 
farms.  This disruption to the population structure throughout the region was felt in most aspects of life:  
social, economic, and political.  The programs brought about a chain of events that would become the 
foundation of future Muslim discontent.  Gutierrez, Eric and Saturnino Borras, Jr., The Moro Conflict: 
Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies, (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), 7. 
2 
historical appeal.5  Following a failed peace agreement in 1976, divisions began 
to form within the MNLF and in 1984 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
was formed. The MILF, as the name indicates, placed more emphasis on Islam 
and most of its leaders were Islamic scholars from traditional aristocratic and 
religious backgrounds.  Even though the MILF distinguished itself from the MNLF 
by stressing the Islamic aspect of the separatist movement, their objectives were 
similar.  In 1991, however, the radical group Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword) 
broke off from the MNLF claiming disagreement with the peace process.  The 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) stated its main purpose as being the establishment of 
an Islamic state, based on Islamic law (Shariah).   
By the mid-1990s, what had originated as a nationalistic struggle 
advocating the concept of the “Moro” identity, had evolved and produced two 
increasingly radical groups.  The first group, the MILF, emphasized the concept 
of an Islamic identity, whereas the second, the ASG promoted a violent call for 
the Islamization of the Muslim community.  Analyzing the causes of 
contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines and the evolution of the 
movement from a nationalist Moro movement to a nationalist Muslim movement 
and a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement is the focus of this thesis.  
B. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the causal factors of 
contemporary radical Islam in terms of traditional legacies and globalization6 
through a case study of Muslim separatist movements in the southern 
Philippines. 
 
                                            
5 The term “Moro”, often used disparagingly by Christian Filipinos, was transformed by the separatists 
into a positive symbol of collective identity—one of unity and continuity.  Islam, Syed Serajul, “The Islamic 
Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,” Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 
5 (May 1998), 418.   
6 For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of globalization is, as described by David Goldblatt (et 
al.):  “Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form and extent of human organization and interaction to a 
transcontinental or interregional level.  It involves a stretching of social relations across time and space such 
that day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and 
the practices and decisions of highly localized groups and institutions can have significant global 
reverberations.”  Goldblatt, David, David Held, Anthony McGrew and Jonathan Perraton, “Economic 
Globalization and the Nation-State:  Shifting Balances of Power,” Alternatives, vol 22, no 3 (1997), p. 271. 
3 
This thesis will demonstrate that contemporary radical Islam in the 
southern Philippines is a fusion of factors associated with both tradition and 
globalization.  Additionally, elements of each (tradition and globalization) evolve 
in that the factors that were important to one group at a certain point in time were 
not the same for another group at a different point in time.  Therefore, the 
argument is two-fold:  (1) Contemporary radical Islam is both a product of 
globalization and traditional legacies.  That is, the two groups, the MILF and 
ASG, that were created as a result of a split from the first major Muslim separatist 
movement in the Philippines, the MNLF, have factors associated with both.  (2) 
The role of globalization and tradition as causal factors of contemporary radical 
Islam with regard to the two groups, MILF and ASG, differ significantly. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
The thesis has importance at both the global and country-specific levels.  
First, with regard to the Global War on Terrorism, the 9/11 Commission 
recommended a two-pronged strategy in combating Islamic terrorism7:  disrupt 
the leadership of terrorist networks and counter the rise of radical ideologies 
within the Islamic world that inspire terrorism.8  Although the first goal has been 
the focus of current U.S. policy, and works to gain the more short-term goal of 
stabilization through destabilization of the enemy, the second, more long-term 
goal has seemingly been neglected.  Combating the rise of radical ideologies 
within the Islamic community requires differentiating between causes and 
enablers as well as analyzing and understanding the origins and causal factors. –
As author Alan Richards stated regarding the matter, “…the wrong diagnosis will 
typically lead to the wrong prescription.”9  
                                            
7 Terrorism is, as defined by Martha Crenshaw: “…the deliberate and systematic use of threat of 
violence to coerce changes in political behavior.  It involves symbolic acts of violence, intended to 
communicate a political message to watching audiences.” Found in:  Conteh-Morgan, Earl, Collective 
Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflict, (New York: Routledge, 
2004), 255, (Source not noted). 
8 Kean, Thomas H., et al, 9-11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 363. 
9 Richards, Alan, Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic 
Radicals, (Carlisle, Pa: US Army War College, July 2003), 2. 
4 
The second dimension is in relation to the conflict in the southern 
Philippines and is comprised of two facets.  First, analyzing the conflict in the 
Philippines from the broader perspective of the role of Islam and how it was and 
is currently being affected by both globalization and radical Islamism will present 
a more comprehensive diagnosis of the problem.  This diagnosis can then be 
applied in resolving the conflict by addressing both the internal aspects of the 
causes of the conflict as well as the external influences.  Secondly, following the 
9/11 attacks the United States drastically enhanced its relationship with the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R.P.).  Since then the two 
governments have continued to work closely in support of the G.R.P.’s domestic 
war on terrorism and the U.S. government has dedicated a significant amount of 
resources.  The findings of this thesis will be applied to examine if current U.S. 
policy is appropriate and useful for ending that conflict.   
D.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most studies on terrorism and Islamism analyze the issue from a global, 
regional or country perspective.  Regarding the research focus of this thesis, 
there are basically two approaches in the literature on contemporary radical 
Islamism.  While the first approach defines the problem in terms of culture and 
religion, the second approach emphasizes the impact of globalization as the core 
of the problem.  To caveat, however, it is important to note that most scholars 
agree contemporary radical Islam is not exclusively due to tradition or 
globalization, but that one plays a significantly larger role than the other.   
The most in-depth work in this field is undeniably by scholars writing from 
the global perspective.10  This prospective covers a broader spectrum of 
terrorism and Islamism across the Muslim world.  There is little consensus 
among scholars writing from this perspective with various cultural, political, and 
economic factors being cited as the core cause of radical Islamism. The opinions 
                                            
10 See works from: Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of Civilizations,”  Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 
(summer 1993), 22-50; Kepel, Gilles, Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam, translated by Anthony F. Roberts, 
(Cambridge, Ma: Belknap press of Harvard University Press,  2002); Rapoport, David.  “The Fourth Wave,” 
in Cronin, Audrey Kurth.  Attacking Terrorism:  Elements of a Grand Strategy, (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46-73; Cronin, Audrey Kurth, “Behind the Curve:  Globalization and 
International Terrorism,” International Security, vol. 27, vo. 3 (Winter 2002/03), 30-58; Richards. 
5 
of these scholars range significantly.  Scholars such as Samuel Huntington 
looked to differences among cultures as the (inevitable) cause of conflict.11  
Author Paul Berman, on the other hand, sought the answer from political factors 
by explaining that conflict has nothing to do with Islam and everything to do with 
totalitarianism whose greatest threat is liberal society.12 Still others such as Alan 
Richards center on socioeconomic factors.13   
Most authors writing from the Southeast Asian regional perspective focus 
on the idea that Islamic militancy, or radical Islamism, is a result of internal 
conflict and festering historic grievances.14 This is certainly not surprising since 
contemporary radical Islam as a product of globalization would have been a very 
hard argument to make considering many conflicts started before the impacts of 
globalization were evident.  In recent years however, the emergence of 
transnational terrorist links has motivated many scholars to emphasize the 
international dimension of terrorism, that is the prospects of “imported” terror, and 
to analyze the possibility that rising support for radical Islamism is caused by 
deepening levels of globalization.15  
With regard to the Philippines, the question of “homegrown” versus 
“imported” terrorism is even more intriguing given that the conflict has evolved 
and splintered twice over the past three decades.  Although there is certainly 
strong agreement as to the historical causes of the conflict, there is considerable 
debate as to why it has endured and is becoming increasingly more violent.  
Scholars studying the Philippines are divided over whether the conflict is being 
                                            
11 Huntington, 22-50. 
12 Berman, Paul, Terror and Liberalism, (NY:  Norton, 2004). 
13 See Richards. 
14 For works emphasizing internal factors see: Simon, Sheldon, “Managing Security Challenges in 
Southeast Asia: Essays by Sheldon W. Simon,” NBR Analysis, vol. 13, no 4, (July 2002) 25-37; 
Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan, ed., After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 
(Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2003), 1-35; 
Azra, Azyumardi.  “Bali and Southeast Asian Islam:  Debunking the Myths,” in Ramakrishna, Kumar and See 
Seng Tan, 39-56. 
15 For works emphasizing transnational factors see:  Wright-Neville, David, “Dangerous Dynamics: 
activists, militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review, vol. 17, no. 1, (March 2004), 27-46; 
Abuza; Smith, Paul J., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and 
Regional Stability, (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2005). 
6 
prolonged due to external influences such as globalization16 (not just as a 
backlash to it but also the internationalization of terrorism), or if it’s actually 
internally generated quests for socio-religious identity.17   
According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, the work in the field of radical Islamism 
(or religious terrorism in general) suffers from a gap in knowledge.  She states 
that because the phenomenon of religious terrorism crosses over so many 
academic fields (including, but not limited to, political science, sociology, 
psychology, theology, economics, anthropology, history, law, and international 
relations) it poses a challenge for an academic community that is unaccustomed 
to collaborating.  As a result of not having overcome this challenge, many 
hypotheses regarding the origins of terrorism have yet to be substantiated or 
disproved and the area of research, in general, remains predominantly 
underdeveloped.  As Audrey Cronin points out, “The distinctive perspectives and 
modes of research engaged in by scholars in each of those disciplines have led 
most to rely on the familiar perspectives and long-established arguments that are 
prevalent in each field.”18  This gap is a problem at the source level.  That is, 
students researching the topic of contemporary radical Islam are limited to 
sources or references that are “stove-piped” in one academic field and there is 
little that can be done to overcome this challenge.  However, in this thesis, 
references from the various academic fields were specifically sought out in an 
effort to blend the views and minimize the gap.   
As previously stated, the major debate surrounding the issue of 
contemporary radical Islam is whether the core causal factors (as opposed to 
factors that prolong conflicts and are therefore enablers rather than causes) are 
generated as a product of globalization or a legacy of tradition—Is it a response 
to external influences or is it internally generated from a resurgence of deeply 
rooted traditions?   
                                            
16 For works supporting the globalization theory see:  Tan, Andrew, “The Indigenous Roots of Conflict 
in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao,” in Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan, 97-116; Rodell, 
Paul A.  “The Philippines and the Challenge of International Terrorism” in Paul J. Smith, 122-144. 
17 See McKenna, Thomas M.  Muslim Rulers and Rebels:  Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in 
the Southern Philippines, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
18 Cronin, Attacking Terrorism, 39. 
7 
The most renowned author, writing from the global perspective and 
supporting the school that espouses contemporary radical Islam as a reaction to 
conflicts among the world’s great cultural and/or religious traditions, would 
undoubtedly be Samuel Huntington.  In his 1993 publication, “Clash of 
Civilizations,” Huntington views Islam, together with a few other major religions, 
as a global religion not restricted to national boundaries.19  Huntington argues 
that the increased propensity of people to define their identity in ethnic and 
religious terms will result in an "us" versus "them" mentality that when combined 
with cultural and religious differences over policy issues (human rights, 
immigration, trade, the environment, etc.) and the encroachment of the West (i.e. 
promoting its values as universal, global military and economic hegemony) will 
result in the mobilization of anti-West groups based on common religious and 
“civilization” identity.  Religious conflicts are, therefore, global and not national. 
Along these same lines, but perhaps a stronger, more direct argument for 
the legacy of tradition school of thought comes from Gilles Kepel who argues that 
this new form of terrorism is not the forceful indignation of a powerful Islamist 
movement, but rather that of a declining one.20  He states that during the 1970s 
and 1980s the Islamist movement appealed to those Muslims who were 
frustrated with the status quo and viewed the political ideals of Islamism as their 
glimmer of hope, but as the movement began to fail to politically mobilize and 
strengthen, desperate measures of violence and destruction were taken to 
reverse the decline.  These measures resulted in increased militancy and the 
tolerance of terrorism.21   
The final proponent of the legacy of tradition school of thought is David 
Rapoport.  Although his arguments do not center on the question of the actual 
causes of conflict, he uses a more systematic, and cyclical approach that centers 
on socio-political ideologies to develop his classification of contemporary 
religious terrorism, mostly Islamic, which he names the “fourth wave” of 
                                            
19 Huntington, 26.  
20 Kepel, 4. 
21 Green, John, “Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam,” The Booklist. Chicago, vol. 98, iss. 15, (1 April 
2002), 1284. 
8 
international terrorism.22  His argument focuses on the ideological inspirations 
that resulted in terrorism.  In the first wave the anarchists were inspired by the 
failure of a democratic reform program, then the anti-colonialists called for 
national self-determination and in the third wave leftist movements were driven 
by the theme that existing systems were not truly democratic.  At the core of the 
fourth or religious wave is the call for the end to secularism, and therefore (by 
default) democracies.  He further states that Islam is at the heart of this wave and 
describes his hypothesis as follows:   
[The] political events providing the hope for the fourth wave 
originated in Islam, and the successes achieved apparently 
influenced religious terror groups elsewhere.  Although there is no 
direct evidence for the latter connection, the chronology is 
suggestive….  Three events in the Islamic world provided the hope 
or dramatic political turning point that was vital to launch the fourth 
wave.  In 1979 the Iranian Revolution occurred, a new Islamic 
century began, and the Soviets made an unprovoked invasion of 
Afghanistan.23  
Contrary to Rapoports argument is that of Audrey Kurth Cronin who views 
contemporary radical Islam as more of a power struggle between the “haves” and 
the “have-nots” brought on by the economic and political disparity of 
globalization.  She basically argues that  
…even though the newest international terrorist threat, emanating 
largely from Muslim countries, has more than a modicum of 
religious inspiration, it is more accurate to see it as part of a larger 
phenomenon of anti-globalization and tension between the have 
and have-not nations, as well as between the elite and 
underprivileged within those nations.  In an era where reforms 
occur at a pace much slower than is desired, terrorists today, like 
those before them, aim to exploit the frustrations of the common 
people (especially in the Arab world).24   
                                            
22 According to Rapoport, waves of modern terrorism were generated first by the anarchist movement 
in the late nineteenth century; second by the anti-colonial movement in the 1920s; and finally by the radical 
ideas of the “New Left” in the 1960s. Cronin, Attacking Terrorism, 39.     
23 Rapoport, 61. 
24 Cronin, Behind the Curve, 35. 
9 
Furthermore, she states the jihad era is energized by a pervasive sense of 
alienation and search for religious identity and doctrine.25  Therefore, she argues 
that the challenge of dealing with this type of terrorism is two-level:  the religious 
zealots and the broader enabling environment of failed social, political and 
economic institutions.26   
Cronin is not alone, Alan Richards also declares the effects of 
globalization, or more specifically the socioeconomic impact of failing to fully 
integrate into the global economy, have contributed to the spread of radicalism.27  
He states that Islamic radicalism is a political response to the socioeconomic, 
cultural and political crisis throughout the Islamic world that was brought on by 
modernization and globalization.  According to Richards, overwhelming growth in 
population and urbanization along with failing government policies and negative 
changes in education caused increased levels of unemployment and poverty 
which alienated many Muslim youths.28   
From the Southeast Asian regional perspective, the debate surrounds the 
idea of “homegrown” versus transnational terrorism and that the “brand” of 
Islamic radicalism throughout Southeast Asia was specific to the region.  From 
there the debate further breaks down to what the causal factors of radicalism in 
SEA are; internal or external, reverting back to tradition or responding to 
globalization.   
In his article, David Wright-Neville states; “…the prevailing orthodoxy was 
that [Southeast Asia] was home to a benign form of Islam quarantined from the 
troubling cultural dynamics that had given this religion in other parts of the world 
a militant and sometimes violent edge.”29  Sheldon Simon maintains this view 
and asserts that terrorism in Southeast Asia is homegrown with concerns largely 
being confined to national borders.30   Although he acknowledges there are some 
                                            
25 Cronin, Behind the Curve, 37.  
26 Ibid, 38.  
27 Richards, 4. 
28 Ibid, v. 
29 Wright-Neville, 27. 
30 Simon, 25. 
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ties to Al Qaeda, Simon holds that the level of cooperation and coordination 
among terrorist groups is nowhere near that of groups outside the region.31  
Furthermore, Simon argues that the approach to countering terrorism is in 
dealing with the causes which he views as the political, social and economic 
environments. 
…Southeast Asian states must change the political, social, and 
economic milieus that breed terrorism. Specifically, socioeconomic 
development in the southern Philippines must take place, and 
economic recovery in Indonesia, the restoration of law and order in 
the Moluccas and Sulawesi, and a political solution to the conflicts 
in Aceh and Irian Jaya must be sought. [Until] the socioeconomic 
deficits [are] erased, terrorism will continue to flourish regardless of 
outside efforts to eradicate it. Hunting down terrorists deals with the 
symptoms but not the underlying disease.32  
Zachary Abuza, a strong proponent of the new orthodoxy, argues that 
views such as Simon’s are outdated.  He suggests this has changed in the last 
few years as incidents of radical Islamist terrorism throughout the region 
increased significantly and asserts that although Muslim grievances are local, 
there is a distinct trend in the region since 1990—an expansion of transnational 
activities of radical Islamists.33   Abuza emphasizes the fact that although the 
historical roots of militant Islam is nothing new in the region, the links to 
international terrorist groups is.34  And for Abuza, the international aspect of 
terrorism in Southeast Asia cannot be underestimated.35 
Paul Smith shares Abuza’s beliefs and further expounds in that Islamic 
militancy is being imported to the region, predominantly through charities, 
through Middle Eastern Islamic ideologies, specifically Wahhabism.36  Smith, 
reiterating Abuza’s point regarding the experiences of Southeast Asians in the 
                                            
31 Simon, 25.  
32 Ibid, 37. 
33 Abuza, 4. 
34 Abuza, 81. 
35 Ibid.  “Al-Qaida did not simply arrive in the region and establish a network from scratch, but rather 
they found groups who had already been established and had legitimate grievances that they had been 
fighting for a prolonged period.” 
36 Smith, xi. 
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Middle East, states that aside from Islamic ideological influences, the historical 
developments in the Middle East also account for the changing Islamic mind-
set.37 More specifically, Barry Desker maintains that this trend is attributable to 
two major historic events—the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.    
The psychological impact of the Iranian Revolution and the 
subsequent revolutionary experience of many Southeast Asian 
Mulsims, who either volunteered in the Afghan jihad against the 
Soviet army or studied in Saudi and Pakistani madrasas imbibing 
the local culture of political violence and change, polarized the 
Islamic milieu in the region.38 
Along these same lines of external religious influence, but from the 
perspective of the debate surrounding the question of the causal factors of 
radicalism in Southeast Asia, Azyumardi Azra and Kumar Ramakrishna contend 
that the emergence of neo-Salafism39 is the root of radical Islamism.  Azra and 
Ramakrishna suggest that although socioeconomic factors facilitate radicalism, 
addressing the politico-religious roots of radicalism is essential to combating 
terrorism.40  Conversely, Zachary Abuza views the problematic internal situation 
as the core of the issue:   
The growth of Islamic extremism around the world since the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 has less to do with theology and a lot to 
do with the failure of the domestic political economies of their 
respective countries.  Increasing gaps between the rich and poor, 
unemployment, corruption, a lack of economic diversity, and the 
lack of a viable political alternative have all given rise to Islamic 
extremism.  People literally become so desperate that they have 
nowhere to turn but to extremist religious politics.41 
                                            
37 Smith, xii. 
38 Desker, Barry, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, vol. 25, no. 3 (December 2003), 495. 
39 Neo-Salafism is defined as that “…which blends the return-to-roots fundamentalism of traditional 
Salafism, with the additional ideational thread of an Islam under siege from Christian, Zionist and secular 
forces.” Ramakrishna, Kumar, “US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-terrorist or Counter-terrorism,” in 
Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan, ed., 321. 
40 Azra, 53, and Ramakrishna, 320.  
41 Abuza, 16. 
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In between the debate of new versus old orthodoxy is Wright-Neville who 
agrees that the old orthodoxy is outdated, but is critical of the new orthodoxy.  He 
suggests that the threat is exaggerated because of “…a failure to account for 
nuanced differences in the nature of Islamist politics in the region”42 and that it is 
actually an “attitudinal dynamic” that is legitimizing extremists in the eyes of many 
Southeast Asian Muslims.  Wright-Neville called for “an understanding of the 
complex interplay of cultural, economic, political and social forces that lay behind 
this attitudinal shift.”43 
The debate regarding the conflict in southern Philippines in particular 
overlaps the arguments of both the global and regional perspective.  Some 
scholars, such as Thomas McKenna, maintain the argument of tradition—citing 
resistance to colonialism that dates back centuries and the ensuing formation of 
an Islamic identity.44  McKenna states that “the struggle for Muslim separatism in 
the Philippines (or for that matter any separatist struggle) may only be 
adequately understood by means of a wide-ranging and multilayered analysis of 
domination, accommodation, and resistance.45  McKenna suggests that the 
contemporary Muslim Separatist movement is purely a legacy of tradition based 
around the dynamics of ethno-religious politics.  It must be noted, however, that 
McKenna limits his scope of discussion to the MNLF and the MILF—the ASG is 
not mentioned.46   
Others such as Andrew Tan47 argue that the failure to develop socio-
economically in the midst of an increasingly modern and globalizing world has 
led to the violent recourse of fundamentalist Muslims.  Tan views religion as a 
“rallying call and focal point of resistance to the government” and emphasizes 
that conflict is a nationalist and territorial struggle.48  Furthermore, although Tan 
                                            
42 Wright-Neville, 27. 
43 Wright-Neville, 27. 
44 See McKenna. 
45 Ibid, 5.   
46 One reason for this might be that McKenna’s research was limited to the southern Philippines city of 
Cotabato or “Campo Muslim” whereas the ASG operated mostly in the Sulu Archipelago. 
47 Tan, 112. 
48 Ibid. 
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acknowledges that the pan-Islamic militant ideology of the founding members of 
groups such as the ASG can be traced to their experiences in the Afghan 
conflict, he states that these links should not be overemphasized.  The topic of 
international terrorism, Tan states, with links to groups such as Al Qaeda, has 
moved to the forefront since 9/11, but the fact remains that armed Muslim 
separatist movements long predated this phenomenon.49  Still others such as 
Paul Rodell emphasize the transnational “flavor” of the groups in the Philippines 
and the non-economic effects of globalization—more appropriately, the rising 
influences of external entities.50  While Rodell agrees with Tan that the Muslim 
separatists in the Philippines were inspired by their experiences in the Afghan 
conflict, he further contends that fundamentalist Islam became a divisive issue 
among leaders of the MNLF as early as 1977 and led to the creation of the 
MILF.51  For Rodell, the increasing role of religious fundamentalism opened the 
door to transnational terrorism in the southern Philippines.52  He concludes that if 
it is to be closed, the enabling environment for international terrorism must be 
removed through internal socio-economical and political means.53   
In summary, the study of contemporary radical Islam is extremely diverse 
and scholars from all three perspectives (global, regional and country specific) 
have proposed an array of factors as being the cause of contemporary radical 
Islam.  The debates can, however, be categorized into two views:  Those who 
see the causal factors as being an internally generated legacy of tradition and 
those who contend it is an externally generated product of globalization.  Those 
who support the legacy of tradition school cite cultural identity, ideological 
inspiration and historical political, social and religious grievances as the major 
contributing factors.  For those who support the impact of globalization claim, the 
underlying factors are viewed as being based on the socio-economic and political 
disparity and internationalization of radicalism brought on by globalization.  
                                            
49 Tan, 98. 
50 Rodell, 132. 
51 Ibid, 123. 
52 Ibid, 132.   
53 Ibid, 138. 
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E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The primary questions analyzed in this thesis is:  Is the current conflict in 
the southern Philippines between Muslim minorities and the government of the 
Philippines, supported by the country’s Christian majority, a consequence of the 
legacy of traditional Islam or a product of globalization?  In the instance that both 
play a role, how can the level of influence and relevance of each factor be 
assessed?  In answering these questions, the following three questions must first 
be addressed:  First, is globalization an enabler or a root cause? Second, how 
has radical Islamism evolved?  And third, from a regional perspective how has 
the internationalization of radical Islamism affected Southeast Asia, both Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike? 
F.   METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this study is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the root 
causes and the role of Islam in order to explain the evolution of the protracted 
separatist movements in the Philippines with respect to their ideologies, 
objectives, and tactics.  Therefore, this study is an exercise in diachronic 
comparative analysis.54  It analyzes and compares and contrasts two different 
periods during the southern Philippines conflict that are considered the formative 
years for each group.  The first is from 1976, when the MNLF settled for 
autonomy in signing the Tripoli Agreement, to 1984, when the MILF officially 
broke off and formed a separate movement.  The second is from 1989, when the 
ASG entered the conflict, to 1995 when it waged its major terrorist attacks.  The 
analysis focuses on the causes of the formation and increased radicalization of 
the groups with respect to factors associated with tradition and globalization.  
Therefore, the independent variables are tradition and globalization, while the 
dependent variable is contemporary radical Islam.   
The sources for this thesis are predominantly academic.  Other sources 
include reports and documents issued by the Philippine, United States, and 
Australian governments, and reports and documentations from several non-
government organizations. 
                                            
54 For the purposes of this thesis, a diachronic comparison is defined as the study of a phenomenon as 
it changes through time.   
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G. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II (Background) begins with a brief discussion of the arrival and 
development of Islam throughout Southeast Asia.  Then it transitions to how 
Islam spread within what is today known as southern Philippines and focuses on 
the impact and development of the various ethnic communities.  The third section 
of the chapter provides an overview of the history of conflict against the Spanish 
and American colonizers focusing on the role of Islam.  Finally the factors and 
courses of events that ended organized rebellion of the Moro National Liberation 
Front are discussed.   
Chapter III (Contemporary Radical Islam) provides an analysis of the 
origins and root causes.  The chapter begins with a description of the evolution of 
contemporary radical Islam then provides an analysis and evaluation of the 
various factors of tradition and globalization and the impact of each on the 
development of contemporary radical Islam.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that contemporary radical Islam is a fusion of factors related to 
globalization as well as tradition.   
Next, in Chapter IV (Evolution and Ideology), the analysis is taken one 
step further.  That is, on top of being a fusion of the two concepts, the 
importance, prioritization and level of influence each had was not the same for 
the groups.  Basically, although both factions were from the MNLF, the factors 
that caused the MILF to organize were not the same as those that caused the 
ASG to breakaway. Therefore, the impact of globalization and tradition on MILF 
was not the same as it was on ASG.  Evolution of the group would certainly affect 
the tactics, but how does it affect the core ideology of the group? 
Finally, in Chapter V (Implications and Conclusion) the findings are 
summarized and the importance of the thesis is reviewed.  Also discussed are 
possible implications on U.S. foreign policy with respect to the Philippines and 
the importance of developing U.S. policy based on this understanding of 
contemporary radical Islam as an evolving fusion of impacts of globalization and 




























A. INTRODUCTION   
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the 
origins of Islam in Southeast Asia and more specifically the Philippines and to 
discuss the role of Islam in the anti-colonial struggle against the Spanish and 
Americans as well as the factors that led to organized Muslim rebellion.  The 
chapter begins with a brief discussion of the arrival and development of Islam 
throughout Southeast Asia and how Islam spread within what is today known as 
the southern Philippines—focusing on the impact and development of the various 
ethnic communities.  The bulk of the chapter provides an overview of the history 
of the conflicts against the Spanish and American colonizers focusing on the role 
of Islam.  Finally the factors and courses of events that ended organized rebellion 
of the Moro National Liberation Front are discussed.   
B.  ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
There is little consensus among scholars as to the origins of Islam in 
Southeast Asia but they do generally agree that Islam was first introduced in the 
region as a by-product of the trade routes between the Indian Ocean and the 
South China Sea.  The crux of the debate regarding the origins of Islam in 
Southeast Asia surrounds the question of by whom and when Islam was first 
proselytized there.  One of the most comprehensive and best supported theories 
is by D. R. SarDesai, who contends that Arab contact with Southeast Asians 
predated Islam as traders visited the region on their way to China and continued 
this practice even after converting to Islam.  However, fearing the possibility of 
risking their trade and relationship with local elites, these Arab-Muslim merchants 
made no real attempt to convert the locals.  He further asserts that the Indians 
had no such fears for they had established themselves as bearers of rich 
traditional and cultural influences throughout Southeast Asia early on and that in 
fact, with regard to outside influences of culture, India had the greatest impact 
throughout the region.  As SarDesai describes: 
18 
…most of Southeast Asia followed the Indian cultural patterns.  The 
absorptive, syncretic quality of Indian culture …succeeded in 
striking roots in the Southeast Asian region, which adopted the 
alien cultural traits without in the process losing its identity.  The 
relative acceptability of Indian culture may be further attributed to 
geographical commonness, relative lack of Indian political ambition 
in the region, and the state of commerce between India and 
Southeast Asia.55   
Religion was perhaps the most obvious account of this influence.  Since 
both Buddhism and Hinduism evolved in and spread from India to Southeast Asia 
during the first millennium, it is quite possible that Islam too, although arriving 
later, was introduced and welcomed in the same manner.  SarDesai also 
contends that Indian influence was the work of both commercial traders 
(predominantly from the Indian coastal regions of Gujarat56 and Coromandel) 
and the Brahmans, or priestly class—which accounted for the extensive 
“acculturation” of the class of Southeast Asian elites.57  He further concludes that 
the fact that Indians were promoting Islam gave it a certain level of legitimacy 
among Southeast Asians, but another aspect that appealed to them was that, 
reminiscent of Hinduism and Buddhism, it came in a relatively peaceful fashion 
and made some accommodations.  This theory seems fitting when taking into 
account the legacy of tolerance and compromise that is reflected even today in 
the practice of Islam by Southeast Asian Muslims. 
Although the ideological appeal of Islam in general attributed to the 
acceptance of Islam by Southeast Asians, the initial spread of Islam can be 
attributed to the fact that merchants began to combine trade with the peaceful 
transmission of religion and culture.  More specifically, they developed kinships 
by marrying royalty and raising the children under Islam, provided economic 
                                            
55 SarDesai, D. R., Southeast Asia; Past and Present, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 17. 
56 Notably, Islam was originally peacefully introduced in India by Arab merchants and missionaries and 
spread in northern trade regions of India including Gujarat beginning in the eighth century A.D., but this 
peaceful relationship ended when, at the turn of the first millennium, the Turkic tribes invaded the Indian 
subcontinent from the northeast.  Website on South Asia History which credits the library of Congress and 
dated 1995: http://www.cet.edu/earthinfo/sasia/SAhis.html and website on Islam in India:  
http://www.indianchild.com/comming_of_islam.htm.  Both were accessed November 2005.  
57 SarDesai, 18. 
19 
incentives by offering better terms of trade to Muslims in the region, and inspired 
rulers to convert by holding superior positions in trade and business.   
Scholars generally agree that the thirteenth century A.D. marked the 
beginning of the Islamization of insular Southeast Asia and that it became well-
established by the fourteenth century.58  (Reference Figure 1 below.)  Several 
factors can be attributed to the subsequent spread of Islam throughout the Malay 
Archipelago during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries:  increased competition 
over trade between the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit and Muslims, the 
development of Muslim-controlled Malacca as a major center of trade, the 
aggressive proselytization of Christianity by the Portuguese, and the subtle and 
unwavering Sufi59 missionaries.60  
 
Figure 1.   The Spread of Islam61 
                                            
58 Islam, Syed Serjul, The Politics of Islamic Identity in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Thomson Learning, 
2005), 18. 
59 “[In] Southeast Asia, Islam was spread primarily by Sufi brotherhoods and merchants rather 
than the armies of Islam.  Sufism brought a message of Islam whose mystical doctrines and practices 
proved attractive to many and was open to linkages with local religious traditions and customs.  Whereas 
official Islam often emphasized strict observance of the letter of the law, Sufism presented an alternative 
tradition flexible and open to assimilation and synthesis.  Outside influences were absorbed from 
Christianity, Neoplatonism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.” Esposito, John, The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality?, 
(NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 35.  
60 SarDesai, 60. 
61 Ibid. p. 59. 
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In the fourteenth century, Siam and the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit 
competed for maritime trade.  By the turn of the fifteenth century, however, 
Majapahit was weakened by a war of succession and the entry of Malacca as a 
trade competitor.  Malacca, however, after being established as a great port city, 
found itself competing with adversarial forces and eventually looked to the 
Muslim states of Sumatra for support.  As a result of recognition by the Sultan of 
Pasai on Sumatra, Malacca advanced the spread of Islam and became the ideal 
example of how despite implementing Islamization, local customs and traditions 
were untouched.62   
Islam’s greatest level of expansion occurred during the sixteenth century 
as it finally reached inland villagers of major islands and the Indonesian 
Archipelago.63  Ironically, this was also the period when the Christianity touting 
Portuguese dominated trade in the region.  During their reign, the inclination to 
force Christianity on the indigenous peoples, despite the fact that they had 
historically been receptive to the peaceful incursion of religious influences, drew 
deep resentment and increased the spread of Islam as it became a “weapon” or 
symbol of unity against the oppressive Portuguese.  The behavior of the 
Portuguese left Muslims leaning on one another for trade and marginalizing trade 
with the Portuguese whenever given the opportunity.  The eventual consequence 
of the Portuguese policy was that the spread of Islam was no longer through 
passive means—that is, Southeast Asians throughout the insular region actively 
sought Islam as a means of expressing their discontent with the Portuguese.   
As mentioned previously, the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia is 
attributable to several factors, however, the most important was the way in which 
Islam was presented.  That is, the “compromising spirit of the advocates of the 
new religion, who did not at all insist on the abandonment by the peoples of the 
region of their Hindu-Buddhist cultural heritage.”64  Consequently, Islam only 
                                            
62 SarDesai, 60. 
63 Heidhues, Mary Somers, Southeast Asia: A Concise History, (NY: Thames & Hudson, 2001), 13. 
64 SarDesai, 59. 
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minimally influenced the traditional cultural practices of Southeast Asian 
believers and the indigenous civilization, which then included Hindu-Buddhist 
influences, remained prominent.65  Nevertheless, Islam proceeded to spread 
throughout insular Southeast Asia and over time made it to Mindanao where it 
was halted with the conquest of Manila by the Spaniards.   
Figure 2.   Republic of the Philippines66 
                                            
65 SarDesai, 60. 
66 Website: http://www.hawaii.edu/cps/luzviminda.html. Accessed March 2006. 
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C.   ISLAM IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
Islam arrived in the Philippine archipelago in the late 15th century and 
spread as far north as Manila Bay.  The process by which Islam spread 
throughout modern-day Philippines distinctly resembled that of the rest of 
Southeast Asia—marriage, commercial and political alliances and influential 
rulers.  (Reference Figure 2 above for a map of the Philippines.)  In doing so, 
Islam was crucial to the establishment of political, socio-cultural, educational, and 
religious institutions that significantly contributed to creating and developing 
communal consciousness and a feeling of Islamic identity.67   
Some seven centuries after Muslims began passing through the region of 
Southeast Asia, a sultanate was finally established in the southern Philippines in 
the late 15th century as the first organized form of government in that region.68  
Moreover, according to some scholars, the Sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao 
“…had achieved the most developed and cohesive political organizations of any 
group inhibiting the Islands at that time.”69  Supporting this assertion, Cyrlac 
Pullapilly stated:   
The authority structure placed the sultan at the head of a group of 
datus (chieftans of clans) and by virtue of his armed might and 
shrewd alliances (usually reinforced by marriages) he was able to 
maintain his power.  The sultan and datus were both political and 
religious leaders, and the relationships among the sultan, datus, 
and their people—the whole web of duties, prerogatives, rights and 
obligations—were codified in the Tariq.  It was a clear and specific 
set of rules which was highly conductive to the maintenance of 
stability of the society. 70  
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Admittedly, however, the ensuing power struggles among the Muslim 
leaders would ultimately limit the ability of Muslims to thwart the rise of Western 
colonialists.   
Islam continued to spread north during the first half of the 16th century as 
the Sultanates gained power and prestige and the Islamic institutions became 
well engrained in society.  By the time the Spaniards arrived in 1565, Islam had 
spread to the southern portion of Luzon Island, including the modern-day capital 
of the Philippines, Manila.  By 1571, however, the northward expansion was 
halted when the Spaniards had managed to expel the first sultan of the Manila 
region, Raja Suleiman.71 
The power struggles among Muslim elites would account for the inability of 
the Muslims to effectively meet the challenge of Western encroachment.  The 
major contributing factor behind this phenomenon was that, although Muslim 
Filipinos shared in a belief in Islam, they differed along ethnolinguistic lines—that 
is, they were separated by considerable geographic and linguistic barriers among 
the three major and ten minor ethnolinguistic groups throughout the region (a 
division that remains today).  This can perhaps be attributed to the “non-intrusive” 
way in which Islam was proselytized throughout the region—that factor which 
made Islam attractive also allowed each group to maintain their traditional 
cultural differences and therefore still divided them.   
The three main Muslim Filipino ethnolinguistic groups throughout history 
(and remain today) have been the Maguindanao (or Maguindanao-Iranun) of the 
Cotabato region, the Tausug (or Tausug-Samal) of the Sulu Archipelogo, and the 
Maranao of the Lanao region.  It is estimated that the Tausugs began converting 
to Islam in the late 14th century and were therefore the first of the main 
ethnolinguistic groups to do so.  They also established the Sultanate of Sulu 
which eventually became the strongest political entity by the time the Spanish 
arrived a half century later.72  The Maguindanao are thought to have begun 
converting to Islam in the early 16th century.  They too established a sultanate, 
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the Sultanate of Maguindanao.  Together, the Maguindanao and Sulu Sultanates, 
due to the fact that they were better organized than their northern counterparts, 
would endure the main burden of the war against the Spanish that spanned 
centuries.  The Maranao, who lived in the isolated and inaccessible territories of 
northwestern Mindanao, were the last of the main groups to convert to Islam.  All 
three groups significantly differ in “their languages, subsistence patterns, social 
and political development, degree of Islamization, contacts with the non-Muslim 
world, dress, customs, arts and other aspects of culture.”73   However, all three 
also fiercely resisted non-Muslim encroachment.   
D.   ISLAM AND CONFLICT IN THE PHILIPPINES 
1.   The Moro Wars 
When Malacca fell to the Portuguese in 1511 the Muslims throughout the 
region were awakened to the possibility of foreign subjugation.  For the Moros, 
this fear was realized once the Spanish began to colonize and Christianize the 
northern Philippines in 1565.   According to Moshe Yegar, the Spanish came to 
the southern Philippines  
…to gain Muslim recognition of Spanish sovereignty, to develop 
commercial ties with the Muslims of the south, exploit the natural 
resources in their territory, put an end to their piracy and attacks on 
Christian settlements in Bisaya and Luzon, and convert them to 
Christianity as they had succeeded in doing in the northern 
islands.”74   
 
The three-hundred year long war that ensued came to be known as the 
“Moro Wars.”  Some scholars view this period of Muslim Filipino history as the 
defining period that “…made the Philippine Muslim what he is today” and “helped 
to define his attitudes and relations to all non-Muslim foreigners as well as to 
non-Muslim Filipinos.”75   
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Renowned author Cesar Majul divided the Moro Wars into six stages. 76  
The first stage began in 1569 when the Sultanate of Brunei (who was allied with 
the Sultanate of Sulu) was targeted by the Spanish due to their political and 
commercial control over the Philippine archipelago.77  By 1580, Spain emerged 
as the clear victor, not only in taking Manila as their stronghold, but also in 
managing to diminish Brunei’s influence over the region.  Unfortunately for the 
Spanish, their success did not carry over to the second stage.  Here the Spanish 
failed at their attempt to colonize Mindanao.  The fact that the Muslims were 
allied with the Ternatan, an ethnic group of modern-day Ternate, Indonesia, was 
a significant contributing factor to halting the Spanish.78  In the third stage, which 
began at the turn of the seventeenth century and spanned half a century, the 
Maguindanao and Buayan Sultanates allied and fought the Spanish over control 
of the Visayas.  The Spanish eventually prevailed in their efforts, but not until 
they conquered the Molucca Islands thereby cutting off the aid from the 
Ternatans.  In the fourth stage the Spanish adopted a type of scorched earth 
policy in order to “depopulate Muslim areas” and, perhaps most significantly, 
recruited the indio (previously conquered Filipinos) to fight the Muslims.79  The 
Spanish policy devastated the Muslims and both the Sulu and Maguindanao 
retreated inland until they struck peace agreements in 1645 and 1646 
respectively.80  The agreement gave the Maguindanao Sultanate so much 
territory that it became to the most extensive native kingdom in the history of the 
Philippines, excluding the Republic of the Philippines—it even expanded into the 
Maranao region.  However, merely a decade later, in 1656, Maguindanao was 
back in the throngs of war having declared a “jihad” in order to garner more 
Muslim support.  After seven years of fighting, the Spanish withdrew and peace 
was established once again.  This time, however, it would last 55 years—until 
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1718 when the Spanish tried to retake Zamboanga.  The sultanates used the 
hiatus to reorganize and refortify their empires, and reestablish commercial trade.  
In the fifth stage, the Spanish attempted to weaken Muslim resistance by 
converting the sultans, but failed.  Additionally, Spanish power declined as the 
British invaded, and temporarily controlled, Manila in 1762.  Subsequently, the 
fighting in the south lessened.  Moreover, the British received territory in North 
Borneo from the Sulu Sultanate in a show of gratitude for British aid.81  Finally, in 
the sixth stage, the European rivalry that began in the previous stage intensified 
as the French joined the British in vying for Spanish claims.  Recognizing their 
threat, Spain entered into another agreement with the Sulu Sultanate in 1851.  
Twenty years later the Spanish once again invaded Sulu and the island of Jolo 
fell in 1876.  This final stage was also marked by the technological military 
advances by the Spanish who, throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century, used their innovations to militarily dominate the Muslims.  Nevertheless, 
Spanish reign over the Philippines ended in 1898 when Spain relinquished 
sovereignty over the entire Philippines Archipelago, including the southern 
region, to the United States.82  
Hence, three main points can be drawn from the legacy of the Moro Wars.  
First, although the Spanish were successful in that they managed to exact heavy 
fatalities on the Muslims and rendered their incursions futile, they never gained 
total control of the Muslim regions.83  As Yegar describes:   
While not invariably crowned by success, Spain’s vigorous military 
offensive in the closing decades of its rule in the Philippines 
inflicted heavy losses on the Muslims whose raids became 
ineffectual.  The Muslim sultanates were left with few options.  Their 
commerce was interrupted, many of their settlements destroyed in 
the fighting, and the population depleted because of losses 
sustained in fighting, in starvation, and disease.  In effect, the 
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sultanates lost much of their independence despite the fact that the 
Spaniards did not manage to totally conquer Muslim territory.84 
In the end, despite these hardships, the Muslim political, legal, religious, 
social, and administrative institutions were left in tact and uninfluenced by the 
Spanish.   
Secondly, scholars agree that the wars were in general a religious matter 
for the Muslims—which also meant fighting to preserve the Muslim way of life.   
As Yegar points out:  “…it was the Spanish aim to convert [the Muslims] which 
was the strongest element in Muslim resistance to the Spaniards and their 
Christian allies…”85  However, the question that inevitably arises when 
discussing the topic of the Moro Wars is: What impact did this devastating war 
have on the process of Islamization that was occurring prior to Spain’s arrival?  
As mentioned previously, the spread of Islam was halted and indeed even 
reversed as the Spanish gained control of the northern portions of the Philippines 
and successfully converted the indigenous people to Christianity.  On the other 
hand, with regard to the impact these wars had on the actual development of an 
Islamic consciousness, the answer is less clear.  Some scholars, such as Moshe 
Yegar and Cesar Majul, identify this period as the turning point which resulted in 
the development of an Islamic identity.  Yegar assess that: 
The process of Islamization deepened among Moros, and a 
solidarity, which had not previously existed, was created between 
the various communities.  Resistance to the Spanish and the “Wars 
of the Moro” shaped a concept of an all-inclusive Moro community 
despite differences among the various Muslim ethnic groups.86   
Additionally, Cesar Majul, the foremost historian of Muslims in the 
Philippines, noted that “the motivating force behind [the Spanish-Muslim] wars 
was religious differences”87 and directly correlated the anti-Spanish struggle with 
“growing Islamic consciousness of the Muslims in the Philippines” also stating 
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that “the role that Islam played in stiffening the resistance of the Muslims against 
Spanish efforts to dominate them cannot be over-emphasized.”88  
Others such as Thomas McKenna, however, argue that:  
…Spanish aggression against the Muslim polities of the 
archipelago did not, to any significant degree, stimulate the 
development of an overarching ethnoreligious identity self-
consciously shared by members of various Muslim ethnolinguistic 
groups.  …[Furthermore,] while it is reasonable to assume that 
Islamic appeals were occasionally employed to mobilize opposition 
to Spanish aggression in the southern sultanates, there is little 
historical evidence to suggest that indigenous resistance to the 
Spanish threat led to a heightened Islamic identity among the 
Muslim populace…89     
To clarify, McKenna is not arguing that an Islamic identity does not exist 
today among Muslim Filipinos, he argues that this identity was intentionally 
developed by American colonialists in an effort to “…prepare Philippine Muslims 
for the eventual end of American colonialism and their inclusion in an 
independent Philippine republic as a consolidated and relatively progressive 
ethnic minority.”90   
Third, the wars created very deep seeded hatred and prejudices between 
the Muslims and the indigenous Christians in the Philippines.  As one author 
describes: 
The war, which was marked by bitterness and cruelty, had potent 
religious-theological considerations for both sides, engendering an 
overwhelming hostility between the Muslim and Christian 
populations which has lasted to the present day.  A schism was 
created which split the population sharply along religious lines and 
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2.   American Colonization 
In 1898, as a result of the Spanish-American war, the United States 
gained possession of the Philippines.  The stated policy of the United States was 
outlined by President William McKinley in an address to Congress in 1899:    
The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to 
educate, to train in the science of self-government.  This is the path 
we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us.92 
Therefore, “…American policy in the south was aimed at developing, 
civilizing, strengthening, and preparing the Muslims for self-rule in order to 
integrate them into the mainstream of life in the Philippines.”93  However, it would 
take nearly a decade for the United States to even begin implementing its 
policies of development in the Philippines.  This was due not only to the “Moro 
problem” they inherited from the Spanish, but also the fact that the arrival of the 
Americans coincided with the rise of the Christian-Philippine nationalist 
movement which began fighting the Spanish for independence in 1896.94  
Although allied initially, after realizing the U.S. would not be granting them 
independence, the nationalists engaged in a war against the U.S. that essentially 
ended in 1902 when the movement’s leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, was captured.  
Sporadic fighting continued in the north, but in the south the fighting became 
more intense.   
In mid-1899, the U.S. signed an agreement with the Sultanate of Sulu.  
However, sporadic fighting broke out in 1901 and in 1904 it was officially 
dissolved by the U.S., citing the fact that the current policy “…undercut the 
sovereignty of the United States because of the recognition it gave to the 
authority of the sultan of Sulu in the internal affairs of the sultanate.”95  The 
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tougher policy sought to restrict traditional Muslim authority—that of the sultan 
and the Dato—and proved devastating to the Muslims social fabric.     
With military operations still being waged, in 1903 the U.S. established the 
“Moro Province” which was overseen by U.S. military governors.  These 
governors tried with little success to improve the political, economic, and social 
development of the Muslim regions.  Some progress was mad in the area of 
public works; schools and hospitals were built, agriculture and commerce were 
stimulated, and slavery was banished.96  Although the Americans’ non-religious 
intentions were acknowledged by the Muslims, it soon became evident that they 
too conflicted with Islam.  The differences were evident at the very basic level—
American values of “individualism, social mobility, equality before the law, 
separation of church and state, and the activation of democratic modes in local 
government” directly conflicted with Muslim traditional practices.97  Everything 
aspect of life for the Muslim was affected by the changes; from education to 
taxation, to the very inconceivable concept of separation of church and state—
the cornerstone of American democracy.  As Yegar explains:  
…The Muslims neither understood nor accepted the distinction 
between secular and religious matters which the Americans 
brought with them.  According to Islam, both religious and political 
authority resided in the person of the sultan and the various Dato.  
Infringing on their traditional role could only be construed as an 
affront to religion and the traditional way of life.  As far as Mulsims 
were concerned, the imposition of the laws and customs of foreign 
infidels amounted to religious coercion and was a threat to the 
character of the Muslim Ulama.98 
 Renewed fears among the Muslims that not only were they in danger of 
losing their way of life, but that they were to be incorporated into a politically 
Christian dominated state inspired many Muslims to continue to fight.  
Nevertheless, by 1913 the U.S. Army had routed most of the Muslims and the 
southern Philippines enjoyed relative peace through the decade.  Military control 
was relinquished in 1913 to U.S. civilian authorities and the Moro Province was                                             
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changed to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.  The region progressed 
steadily in all areas of development under the governorship of Frank W. 
Carpenter.  But in 1921, barely a year since the Department was dissolved, 
hostilities renewed in the wake of animosity between the Muslims and the 
Christian Filipinos as the latter replaced the U.S. administrators in the south.   
Another major point of contention for the muslims stemmed from the 
government sanctioned migration policies which began in 1912.  Three factors 
converged and caused the state to sponsor migration policies:  (1) the political-
military tension between the colonial state and filipino revolutionaries in luzon 
since the early years of the twentieth century, (2) the push to extend the reach of 
nation-building, (3) the pull of capital accumulation for both private and state 
interests.99  The government’s initial or “official” objective in promoting 
resettlement programs (the migration of northerners to the south) was to increase 
the production of agricultural crops such as rice and corn by establishing vibrant 
small family farm agriculture.  Although this objective was never fully realized, as 
eric gutierrez and saturnino borras describe, its impact would prove devastating: 
[the] settlement programs were assessed by most scholars and 
policymakers as failures in terms of their officially stated goals…  
the expense of setting up physical infrastructure had been cited as 
among the obstacles (lichauco 1956).  But the impact of such 
programs on the preexisting structural and institutional makeup of 
mindanao would be far-reaching.  As james scott (1998: 191), in a 
more global context, explains: “the concentration of population in 
planned settlements may not create what state planners had in 
mind, but it has almost always disrupted or destroyed prior 
communities whose cohesion derived mostly from non-state 
sources.100 
The programs brought about a chain of events that would become the 
foundation of future muslim discontent.  The indigenous peoples (muslims and 
lumads), especially the poor, became landless and were displaced from their 
communities.  The sheer number of migrants turned the majority of 
predominantly muslim regions into christian dominated areas within a few 
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decades.  In fact, mindanao’s 75% muslim majority at the turn of the century 
would dwindle to 25% in 1960, then less than 18% in 1990 where it seems to 
have remained.101  This disruption to the population structure throughout the 
region was felt in most aspects of life:  social, economic, and political.  Although 
lumads and even some christians felt the depredation caused by these failed 
programs, it was the muslim communities who came to bear the brunt of the 
poverty and social and political exclusion. 
The legacy of the American colonization of the Philippines was two-fold.  
First, they managed to penetrate and control the Muslim territories by force—
arguably finishing what the Spanish had started.  Secondly, but more importantly, 
in their ignorant quest to “civilize” the Philippines, they effectively dismantled the 
Muslim political, legal, religious, social, and administrative institutions.  Along 
these lines, the support for and implementation of the migration policies that 
brought Christians into their homeland was perhaps the most demoralizing.  
Although there was certainly animosity towards the United States, it was 
nowhere near that towards the Christian Filipinos.  The distrust and hatred that 
was seeded during the Moro Wars was only further exacerbated during the U.S. 
occupation. 
E.   MORO ORGANIZED REBELLION  
The Republic of the Philippines was formed on July 4th, 1946, and the so-
called Filipino “nationalist” movement believed their goal had been achieved.  
Most Muslims, however, considered themselves a separate nation and wanted to 
preserve their own social, economic, and political codes and ethics.  By the late 
1960s, after several failed attempts to integrate the Muslim population, 
grievances in relation to Christians coincided with an increasing Muslim self-
consciousness and provided the basis for a separatist movement.  Although 
entwined political, social, and economic grievances created the unrest, two 
events were critical for the formation of that separatist movement.  First, the 
Corregidor incident (also known as the Jabidah Massacre) in March 1968—
where some 30 military trainees, all Muslim, were slaughtered by their superior 
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officers, all Christian—outraged the Muslim community.102  As a result, on May 1, 
1968, Udtog Matalam announced the formation of the Muslim Independence 
Movement (MIM) and issued a manifesto demanding an independent state 
comprised of Sulu, Palawan, and much of Mindanao.  The basis for this 
declaration was the “objection to the turning over of Sabah to Christian Filipinos, 
…indignation at the Corregidor massacre, …and disgust with the conditions of 
Muslim Filipinos.”103  After co-opting some of the MIM leaders by providing them 
high positions in the administration, the Philippine government forced the rest of 
MIM to disband in 1970.  However, an underground movement in the youth 
section of the MIM, feeling betrayed by their leaders, continued and would go on 
to create the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).104  The second factor 
critical to forming separatist movements was the campaign for the elections of 
1971 because it attracted the attention of Muslim states (i.e. Libya and Malaysia) 
and focused attention on the shifting balance of political power between 
Christians and Muslim groups which escalated the level of violence (i.e. tensions 
rose and violence broke out in areas “where Christian migration had resulted in 
Christian majorities and hence had the potential for unseating Muslim political 
leaders, if the Christians voted together.”105).   
The underground separatist movement MNLF was formally organized 
during this time by young men from non-elite Muslim families who had attended 
universities in Manila on government scholarships expressly intended to integrate 
Muslims into the Philippine nation—Nur Misuari became the chairman of 
MNLF.106  The majority of recruitment would come from Tausag (Nur Misuari’s 
group), Samal, and Yakan ethno-linguistic groups concentrated in the Sulu 
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Archipeligo.107  Although its objective was to establish an independent state for 
all the Muslim peoples of the Philippines, the MNLF applied a broader ranging 
central concept of Philippine Muslim nationalism in order to have a more cultural-
historical appeal.  This nationalism was embodied in the term “Bangsamoro” or 
“Moro Nation.” The term “Moro”, often used disparagingly by Christian Filipinos, 
was transformed by the separatists into a positive symbol of collective identity—
one of unity and continuity.  This national character of the MNLF was reflected in 
a policy statement from the first issue of Maharlika, an MNLF newsletter:   
 
From this very moment there shall be no stressing the fact that 
one is a Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a 
Maguindanao, a Maranao, or a Badjao.  He is only a Moro.  Indeed, 
even those of other faith who have long established residence in 
the Bangsa Moro homeland and whose good-will and sympathy are 
with the Bangsa Moro revolution shall, for purposes of national 
identification, be considered Moros.  In other words, the term Moro 
is a national concept that must be understood as all embracing for 
all Bangsa Moro people within the length and breadth of our 
national boundaries.108   
 
Although entwined political, social, and economic grievances created the 
separatist movements such as MNLF, the catalyst that set-off the “war” against 
the Philippine government was the declaration of martial law by President 
Marcos in September 1972.  Additionally, the declaration broadened the base of 
support of Muslim radicals.  Martial law basically centralized the Marcos regime’s 
power to the point that it was almost exclusively in the hands of “Christians” 
including Marcos’ family and associates, technocrats, and the military.  From this 
consolidation, the restrictions on legitimate political activities left only two options 
open for the activists—join and accept regime policies or revolt.  When the 
regime immediately began taking guns away from civilians many interpreted it as 
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threat to their option to later resort to force.  Therefore, both Muslims who 
advocated non-violent actions through political channels and those “opportunists 
ready to seize any chance to achieve immediate goals—for power, wealth, or 
pride—became willing to join the radicals.”109   
In late October 1972 the war broke out as Muslims began their attacks.  
Thousands of lives were lost during the armed struggle in Mindanao and 
hundreds of thousands were displaced.  After nearly four years of fighting, the 
Marcos regime came to the realization that resolving the conflict would require 
more than a military solution, which was also proving impractical, and attempted 
to negotiate a peace settlement of the conflict.   
With the help of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Tripoli 
Agreement was negotiated and signed by the MNLF leaders and the Philippine 
government in December 1976.  This agreement called for an immediate 
ceasefire and established the framework for autonomy in 13 of Mindanao’s 21 
provinces where a majority of Muslims lived.  The ceasefire was short-lived 
because the two sides had serious disagreements on the implementation of the 
pact predominantly on the issue of the plebiscite.  President Marcos, without 
consulting the MNLF, established interim autonomous governments in two 
regions covered under the Tripoli Agreement.  The MNLF accused the 
government of violating the terms of the Tripoli Agreement and refused to 
recognize the autonomous governments.110  
Immediately after the peace agreement was signed, the Bangsa Moro 
Liberation Organization (BMLO) was organized.  Its founders were two traditional 
leaders living as expatriates in Saudi Arabia.  They claimed the BMLO as the 
leader of the Muslim struggle in the Philippines due to their “traditional 
prerogatives” (both were former congressmen and sultans of their provinces).  
Since Nur Misuary, the leader of the MNLF, belonged to a different ethno-
linguistic group and social class he refused to acknowledge the BMLO.  The 
BMLO therefore appealed to the MNLFs second-in-command (and nephew to 
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one of the BMLO leaders) Salamat Hashim who had received extensive religious 
training in Egypt.111  Already divided by ideological differences with Nur Misuary, 
Salamat Hashim demonstrated his independence by creating the “MNLF-
Salamat.” 
In 1977 the movements found themselves back in conflict with the 
Philippine Army.  By 1978 three groups claimed to be the leaders of the Muslim 
movement in the Philippines:  the MNLF-Misuary faction, MNLF-Salamat faction, 
and the BMLO.112  The Muslim separatist movement was in disarray and popular 
support began waning.  The MNLF was especially hard hit by top leaders either 
cooperating with the government or joining MILF.  The movements emerged from 
this low period by acknowledging that they had a similar enemy but differing 
views.  As a result, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) first announced its 
existence as a separate movement from the MNLF in 1984.  The MILF claimed 
the area they considered to be the “Bangsamoro” (Moro Nation) which included 
the islands of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan.   
The MILF, as the name indicates, placed more emphasis on Islam and 
most of its leaders were Islamic scholars from traditional aristocratic and religious 
backgrounds.  The MILF would go on to become the largest group.  Although the 
exact number of members is unknown, the MILF claims to have 120,000 
members while the Government estimates about 8,000 while Western 
intelligence sources cite about 40,000 members.113  Most of its members are 
reportedly from the Maguindanaon and Iranun ethnic groups of the Cotabato 
region.114   
F.   SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide background information on the 
origins of Islam in Southeast Asia and more specifically the Philippines and to 
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discuss the role of Islam in the anti-colonial struggle against the Spanish and 
Americans as well as the factors that led to organized Muslim rebellion.   
Islam throughout Southeast Asia, like Hinduism and Buddhism before it, 
arrived in a peaceful manner and spread throughout Southeast Asia as a result 
of social interaction among communities as well as a defiant gesture against 
external influences.  As Southeast Asians were able to freely adapt Islamic 
practices of their choosing, the form of Islam found in the region is different from 
that of the rest of the world.  The principle reason for this freedom is directly 
attributable to the priorities and origins of the proselytizers of Islam in the region.  
That is, at one point in time Arab Muslims, not unlike Christians, were spreading 
the word of Islam “with a Koran in one hand and sword in the other.”115  As it 
was though, Islam in Southeast Asia became both a symbol of peace and 
resistance.  In a religion such as Islam where it is the definitive authority in all 
aspects of life including, political, economic, legal, and ethical matters, it is not 
hard to see how the historical glamorization of Islam as a “rallying call” meshed 
with this holistic view to create Southeast Asian Islam.  The Philippines was no 
different in this regard and is an ideal example of this phenomenon as religion 
became the one factor that crossed over the vast ethnolinguistic communities.   
The history of the Muslim Filipinos is marred with conflict.  The legacy of 
the three-hundred year Moro Wars was three-fold;  (1) the preservation of the 
Muslim institutions despite an unbending and powerful European foe, (2) the fact 
that although all Muslims fought for the sake of Islam and preservation of their 
culture, they never united as one under Islam, and (3) the fact that Christian-
Filipinos joined the Spanish to fight the Muslims planted the seeds of hatred, 
prejudice, and suspicion that still exists today.  The colonization by the United 
States, however, brought the Muslims their greatest challenge.  Having to 
succumb to the Americans militarily, the institutions the Muslims had fought so 
hard to preserve were dismantled in a matter of decades.  The most devastating 
blow, however, came as an unintended consequence of an agricultural 
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development policy—transmigration of Christians into Muslim areas—which 
further broke down the Muslim institutions.  This became even more evident 
following the creation of an independent Republic of the Philippines.  
Two decades after independence the “Moro Problem” was still unresolved 
and Muslims resorted to organized rebellion against the Philippines government.  
Once again, the Muslims were engaged in conflict, this time, however, it was the 
“Filipino foreigners” they were fighting.  The MNLF was the first to “rally” the 
various Muslim groups with a nationalist call for support.  As the conflict dragged 
on, the alliance began to break down.  The peace agreement was never truly 
adhered to by either party and the conflict continued.  
39 
 
Figure 3.   Map of the Southern Philippines116 
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III. CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAM 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter, for the purposes of this thesis, 
contemporary radical Islam is defined as a movement whose ideology is “to 
establish an Islamic state governed by sharia through violence and extralegal 
means...”117  In order to understand this phenomenon as it has come to exist 
today, it is necessary to understand the chain of events that led to it.   
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the origins and root causes of 
contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines.  The first section is a 
description of the evolution of radical Islamism from its beginning as an anti-
nationalist movement in the Middle East to what is known world-wide today as 
contemporary radical Islam.  The second section outlines the impact traditional 
factors have had on the evolution of radical Islamism in Mindanao while the third 
section is an outlines for factors related to globalization.  In the fourth section 
these factors are evaluated, demonstrating that the two factors are not mutually 
exclusive; in fact contemporary radical Islam in Mindanao is a fusion of both 
globalization and traditional legacies.  
B.   EVOLUTION OF RADICAL ISLAM  
Modern Islamist ideology materialized in the Middle East in the second 
half of the twentieth century as a revivalist, anti-nationalist movement.  In the 
early 1920s much of the Muslim world was under European imperial and/or 
colonial control and the Ottoman Empire—which had been the seat of the 
Caliphate—was dissolved.  The Caliphate, although limited in real power by then, 
was seen as the unifying symbol of Islam by many Muslims.  Muslim empires and 
influence were quickly deteriorating—giving way to Westernization.  It was under 
this perceived threat to Muslim livelihood and a “community in crisis” that 
contemporary Islamic activism emerged.   
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1.   Emergence of Islamic Activism  
The propagators of the Islamic revivalist movement viewed the core of the 
crisis as being two part; Western imperialism and Westernized nationalist Muslim 
leadership.  In the early years of the movement, the most prominent and revered 
theorists were Hassan al-Banna of Egypt and Mawlana Mawdudi of Pakistan.  
The groups founded by each of these religious scholars—the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1928, in Egypt, and the Jamaat-i-Islami in 1941, in India (pre-
dating the establishment of Pakistan in 1947), respectively—remain today the 
hallmark of Islamic movement organizations.  Support for Al-Banna’s 
Brotherhood was limited at first, but eventually the group appealed to the masses 
and grew in numbers—going on to be the largest movement despite its founder’s 
assassination in 1949.  Mawdudi’s Jamaat, however, maintained a modest 
number of followers throughout its history and mostly appealed to the Muslim 
religious-elite in Pakistan.  Both leaders viewed their societies as being too 
reliant on the West, politically ineffectual, and culturally defunct.  Furthermore 
they viewed the increasing incursion of Western culture (such as education, law, 
customs, values) as being significantly more destructive in the long run because 
it directly threatened the core of the Muslim community—its identity.118   
Al-Banna and Mawdudi believed the internal aspects of the problem were 
most pressing and therefore focused on the Islamization of the Muslim 
community.  They shared the belief that Islam, by providing comprehensive 
guidance for every aspect of a Muslim’s life, was better than capitalist and 
Marxist ideologies.  And in support of this key principle, they established 
organizations that promoted social and political activism.119  They both also 
worked to match modernization with scripture and tradition by reinterpreting 
Islam and applying it to the challenges of modernity.  Islamization of society—
through social, peaceful activism—was of the highest priority.  This was 
especially true for Mawdudi, who believed that—although an Islamic state was 
the only infallible mechanism for preserving the Muslim community—he 
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espoused working from within the system by participating in the political 
institutions.  For Mawdudi, the divergence between the “Islamist avant-garde” 
and the Muslim masses did not necessitate armed revolution or even 
resistance.120   
For al-Banna and Mawdudi, the solution to the crisis of the Muslim 
communities in their respective regions lied in indoctrinating the people (socio-
religious reforms) while changing the government (political reform) at the same 
time.  With this in mind, the Brotherhood found an unlikely ally in the nationalist 
movement that had emerged following WWI and was leading the charge for 
independence from European colonizers.   
2.   Rise of Nationalism and Marginalization of Islam 
Nationalist movements, although ideal in the sense that their main 
purpose was to free Muslims from foreign control, proved detrimental to the 
religious entities since their ideology was secularist which marginalized the role 
of religion in society and politics.  As Gilles Kepel explains: 
Nationalist sentiments among Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, 
Malaysians, Indonesians, and others had fragmented the historic 
‘land of Islam’ (dar el-Islam) into communities with clearly different 
priorities.  The nationalists took control of the tools of modern 
communication…and placed them at the service of ideals, such as 
freedom and equality...  This project of emancipation…allowed 
nationalists to thrust aside the religious establishment in their 
pursuit of secular goals.  Above all, it sidelined the ulemas, who 
had traditionally exercised sole control over the written language 
and had used it as a vector for the expression of religious 
values.121 
At first, the call for independence was being espoused by both the 
nationalist groups such as the Free Officers Movement (FOM) and Islamist 
organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  (The former was a group of 
disenchanted young middle-class officers from humble backgrounds with a 
secular-nationalist agenda and the latter called for an “Islamic order” and socio-
religious reform.)  When members of the FOM took over the Egyptian state 
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through a coup d'état in July 1952, the Brotherhood welcomed the change with 
the hope that the new government would unite the country and implement Islamic 
order.122  However, the alliance quickly broke down as the nationalists’ secular 
agenda proved contrary to the goals of the Brotherhood and both camps found 
themselves competing for the same social strata—the urban lower-middle class.  
The competition led to conflict when, in 1954, the Brotherhood was blamed for an 
assassination attempt on the life of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.   
As President of Egypt, and one of the former leaders of the FOM, Nasser 
outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and arrested, imprisoned, exiled, and executed 
most of the leaders and successfully weakened the movement to the point that 
they were rendered powerless for the next two decades.  Demoralized, but not 
destroyed, however, Muslim Brotherhood organizations continued to grow 
elsewhere in the Middle East.  
During the movement’s retreat its remaining followers would look to 
examine the reasons behind their failure.  Many found answers in the prominent 
writings of Islamic scholar and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb.  
Following the assassination of al-Banna in 1949, Qutb emerged as the leader of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  Although influenced by al-Banna and Mawdudi’s 
ideological theories and concept of the Islamic state, Qutb saw the means for 
attaining their goals as requiring a more radical program of action.123  By 
rejecting any and all forms of nationalism, Qutb in effect declared the Egyptian 
polity illegitimate.124  His “uncompromising de-legitimization of all ‘manmade’ 
political communities, prompted in part by the state’s violent attack on the 
Brotherhood and its teachings, [led] many radical Muslim fundamentalists to 
embrace violent struggle…”125 
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Imprisoned during the 1954 government crackdown, Qutb wrote his most 
influential and radical works there until his execution in 1966.  Many scholars 
speculate Qutb was profoundly affected by the Nasser regime’s brutal 
suppression of the Brotherhood:   
…Imprisoned and tortured …he became increasingly militant and 
radicalized, convinced that the Egyptian government was un-
Islamic and had to be overthrown.  …[Furthermore] Qutb regarded 
the West as the historic enemy of Islam and Muslims…  Equally 
insidious, he believed, were the elites of the Muslim world, who 
ruled and governed according to Western secular principles and 
values that threatened the faith, identity, and values of their own 
Islamic societies.126   
3.   The Saudi Arabia Connection 
Unable to publish his work in Egypt, Sayyid’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, 
published them in Wahhabist127 Saudi Arabia where they were held with high 
regard by the growing number of supporters.  In fact, many of the Brothers fled to 
Saudi Arabia in order to avoid persecution and found refuge and a channel to 
voice their beliefs at Saudi universities.  As Kepel explains, despite the fact that 
Qutb’s writings called for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, the Islamists and 
the Wahhabists “…shared certain major points of doctrine—notably the 
imperative of returning to Islam’s ‘fundamentals’ and the strict implementation of 
all its injunctions and prohibitions in the legal, moral, and private spheres.”128  
Despite the alliance and growing popularity with the Wahhabists that 
began in the mid-1950s, the revivalists entered the 1960s still relatively unknown, 
and hadn’t successfully penetrated the social masses.  However, this quickly 
changed by the late 1960s as a direct result of Saudi Arabia’s newfound wealth 
in exporting oil.  Saudi Arabia used its wealth to “export” contemporary Islamism 
by various methods.  Of significance was the Muslim World League—created in 
1962 in Mecca and funded by Saudis as a non-government entity—because it 
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was the first organization established for the purpose of countering nationalist 
influences of leaders such as Nasser by introducing Wahabbism.129  Its 
operations included dispatching missionaries throughout the Muslim world, 
distributing the writings of many of its most prominent ideologists, and building 
Mosques and providing ideological and financial support to various Islamic 
associations.  As discussed later in the chapter, the Saudi campaign was far 
reaching—to include the Moros of the southern Philippines. 
Aside from the League, the global climate also became an important 
factor.  Nationalism (local and regional) combined with the divisive, bipolar nature 
of the Cold War had left the Muslim world politically and religiously at odds.  
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, secularism had permeated the 
governments of almost every majority-Muslim nation, except Saudi Arabia.  
These governments systematically marginalized the power and influence of the 
traditional Islamic leaders, or ulemas, as their once sacred duties were placed 
increasingly in the hands of secular intellectuals.130   
4.   The Weakening of Nationalism and the Revival of Islamism 
As many of the leaders of “nationalist” governments throughout the 
Muslim world became increasingly oppressive and authoritarian, ideologies of 
Islamic revivalism and the call to reestablish Islam and once again normalize the 
cultural, social, and political behaviors of Muslims began to gain momentum.131  
The ensuing “clash of ideologies” between the secularitst and Islamic revivalists 
was particularly true in the “hot bed” of activism at the time—Egypt.   
A major turning point for the Islamist movements—although more a benefit 
in the form of a setback for the nationalists that made the movement more 
appealing for those disillusioned by nationalists—came in June of 1967 as a 
result of the humiliating loss of the Six Day War which culminated with a 
substantial loss of territory including East Jerusalem.  This defeat, made even 
more unpleasant by the fact that Nasser had initiated the war by attacking the 
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Israelis, gravely damaged the credibility of the nationalists’ ideology.  The shock 
left many Muslims disillusioned and looking for answers which resulted in a new 
phase of growth and expansion of religious revivalism.132  The gap between 
secularists and non-secularists began to diminish as the disappointment felt by 
both groups was channeled towards a rejection of Western-style modernization.   
There was a general consensus that Muslims had failed to produce 
a viable, authentic cultural synthesis and social order that was both 
modern and true to indigenous history and values.  Western models 
of political, social, and economic development were criticized as 
imported transplants that had failed, fostering continued political 
and cultural dependence on the West and resulting in secularism, 
materialism, and spiritual bankruptcy.  Neither Western liberal 
nationalism nor the Arab nationalism/socialism of Egypt…had 
succeeded.133  
This soul-searching was compounded by several key events which 
facilitated expansion.  First, Nasser, the strongest proponent of nationalism in the 
Arab world, died unexpectedly in 1970.  His successor, Anwar Al-Sadat, unable 
to match Nasser’s charisma or influence, reached out to Islam in an effort to use 
it as a tool for supporting his weak regime.  He reversed Nasser’s position toward 
the activists by releasing and exonerating the imprisoned and exiled members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  He even allowed the establishment of Islamic 
organizations on university campuses.  All this was done to counterbalance the 
left for he still maintained tight control over the political realm.  Sadat also 
successfully manipulated the religious sector by propagandizing the October 
1973 Egyptian-Syrian war against the Israelis as an Islamic holy war, and 
although in the end it was a loss militarily, among Muslims it was viewed as a 
moral victory for Islam.   
Also during this same period, Saudi Arabia led an oil embargo against the 
US and other Western states in protest over their support for Israel during the 
war.  This event was a major turning point for Middle Eastern international 
relations since it was the first time in modern history that a Muslim country held 
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and applied economic leverage over the (“Western”) international community.  
But the event that boosted the revivalist movements to new heights was the 
Iranian Revolution late in 1978.  The fact that the first successful “Islamic 
revolution” occurred in a non-Arab, Shii Muslim state did not prevent the majority 
Sunni134 Muslims world-wide from accepting and celebrating the victory.135   
Its success in effectively mobilizing Iranians against a seemingly 
invincible shah seemed to validate Islamic activist claims that a 
return to Islam would restore religious identity and vitality and 
enable Muslims, with God’s guidance, to implement a more 
autonomous and self-reliant way of life despite a regime’s military 
power and Western allies.  …it became tangible corroboration for 
those who sought explanations for the apparent failures of their 
governments and believed that less dependence on outside forces, 
greater self-reliance, and the reaffirmation of Islam offered an 
alternative.136      
Emboldened by these events, Islamist movements became increasingly 
radical as well as more militant and factions began to form.  For example, in 
Egypt militant groups like Muhammad’s youth (also known as the Islamic 
Liberation Organization), the Army of God, and Excommunication and Emigration 
attempted to overthrow the government through violent means.  Former 
members of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, disillusioned by the 
moderate stance of the organization as well as the government’s blatant 
misrepresentation of Islam, resorted to supporting revolutionary groups.137   
At this point it was increasingly evident that the fervor of the Iranian 
Revolution, which culminated in February of 1979, resulted in the ideological 
understanding and acceptance of the radical Islamist movement.  However it 
wasn’t until December of that same year when the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan that these movements united and mobilized to fight with their Afghan 
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brethren.  The Mujahadeen, as the Islamist “freedom fighters” would come to be 
known, were comprised of Muslims from all corners of the Muslim world.  And 
after defeating the Soviets they would return to their homelands as heroes who 
had been militarized and undergone a radical process of Islamization. 
Within a span of three decades, Islamic revivalism, which called for 
nonviolent social activism, had evolved into radical militant fundamentalism with 
an ideology that is conceptually counter to the means it is willing to use in 
achieving its goal.  In summary, radical Islamism today evolved from activists’ 
calling to address the problem of a perceived Muslim community in crisis.  
Scholars such as Egypt’s al-Banna and Pakistan’s Mawdudi viewed the solutions 
as coming from within the Muslim community through social and political 
reformation centered on traditional Islamic practices and beliefs.  However, as 
the secular nationalist movements came to power and increasingly marginalized 
the role of traditional religious leaders, it became clear to their successors that 
the nationalists had betrayed their cause.  Scholars such as Qutb viewed the 
Egyptian nationalists as being no different than the governments they had ousted 
and that they could not be reasoned with—only forcibly removed.  This militant 
call to overthrow “ungodly” regimes began to gain momentum throughout the 
1970s as many nationalist governments—having failed to establish vibrant and 
viable economic, political, and social development models—lost legitimacy.  As 
the radical ideology of the Islamists gained popularity, watershed world events 
such as the “October War,” the Saudi Arabian oil embargo, the Iranian 
Revolution, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan emboldened the spirit of the 
movements.  Additionally, political and religious rivalry between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia prompted both to export their revolutionary ideologies.  It is under these 
conditions that contemporary radical Islam came to exist.  In the next two 
sections the causes of contemporary radical Islam are examined in the context of 
being a legacy of tradition and a product of globalization as applicable to the 
conflict in the southern Philippines.   
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C.  RADICAL ISLAMISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: A LEGACY OF 
TRADITIONALISM  
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that contemporary radical 
Islam in the southern Philippines is a legacy of tradition.  In doing so, first a 
summary of how radical Islamism in the Middle East was a legacy of tradition is 
delineated.  This is essential in order to support one of the arguments made in 
this thesis which is that contemporary radical Islamism in the Philippines is not a 
legacy of tradition based on Moro Islamic history, but rather that it is a legacy of 
tradition based on Middle Eastern Islamic history.  This is not to discount those 
experiences unique to the Muslim Filipinos and the influence Islam has in their 
lives.  That is, the fact that Muslim Filipinos generally hold their ancestral heritage 
of resisting Western invaders with such high regard is certainly a part of their 
identity today.  The extent to which the patriotic notion of “defiant resisters” and 
“protectors of the homeland” is attributable to radical Islamic ideology present in 
the southern Philippines is a point of contention among scholars.  However, what 
is without question is that this patriotism did not cause contemporary radical 
Islamism in the southern Philippines—the Moro Islamic heritage is emanated by 
all the separatist groups in the southern Philippines, whether they are secular or 
Islamist.   
1.   Middle Eastern Origins 
Several elements of traditionalism link it to the creation of contemporary 
radical Islamism.  The radical Islamists in the Middle East looked to traditional 
Islam for answers in explaining why their society was in decline in every aspect.  
They viewed their societies as having strayed from Islam in allowing it to be 
marginalized—most specifically by un-Islamic governments and leaders.  
Politically, they viewed their so-called “nationalist” governments, being secular 
and Western-oriented in nature, as working only to minimize the role of Islam in 
the political arena.  Hence, the fundamental cornerstone of contemporary radical 
Islamism was to destroy the “ungodly state” through a violent revolution.   
The West was viewed as a historic external enemy, but the enemies from 
within were considered a more immediate threat since they were directly 
responsible for continuing Islam down its path of decline.  Radical Islamism was 
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viewed by its propagators as the “righteous vanguard” striving to correct a society 
gone astray.138  The movement was driven by the conviction that Jihad was a 
Muslim responsibility and the only means to establishing the new Islamic order.  
This conviction manifested within the group’s members a “…genuine sense that 
they [were] warriors engaged in a desperate struggle for survival against an 
aggressive and powerful enemy intent on humiliating, weakening and eventually 
destroying them.”139  The Islamists believed they were fulfilling the divine 
commandment of establishing an Islamic government.  Along this same line, the 
ideology of the radical Islamists was further supported (in their view) in the 
founding of Islam—they equated the plight of Islam in modern times with that of 
the days of the Prophet when he triumphed over the jahiliyya140 and created his 
Islamic state.141  Whether prevailing over the jahillyya or conducting a Jihad, it is 
clear that the ideological inspiration of contemporary radical Islam is firmly rooted 
in the legacy of traditional Islam. 
2.   Contemporary Radical Islam in the Philippines 
Contemporary radical Islamism in the southern Philippines is a legacy of 
tradition through the Middle East.  That is, radical Islamism in the Middle East 
was a legacy of tradition and those radical Islamist movements influenced, 
encouraged and supported the radical Islamist component present in the 
southern Philippines conflict today.  (This concept is discussed in greater detail 
later in the chapter.)  Unique historical and cultural backgrounds reveal distinct 
differences between the plight and struggle of the Middle Eastern and Filipino 
Muslims.  For example, the Muslims in the Philippines are a religious minority 
whereas in the Middle East there are only sects of Islam that are minorities 
(Sunni vs Shii); the overall objective of the Moro struggle is not to overthrow the 
government but to separate from it entirely in creating a “Moro nation;” Islamic 
leaders in the Philippines do not necessarily believe that the poor condition of the 
                                            
138 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 259. 
139 Burke, Al Qaeda, 32. 
140 Jahillyya is the barbarism and ignorance that preceded the coming of Islam in Arabia.  
See Burke, 329. 
141 Kepel, Jihad, 31.   
52 
Muslims is due to society straying away from Islam, but rather believing the re-
Islamization process will bring about a stronger unified Islamic community to fight 
against an unjust state.  However, these differences are contextual differences 
not ideological.  The core of the ideology of radical Islamism is firmly rooted in 
and applicable to both groups because they both view themselves as the 
righteous vanguard and accept wholeheartedly that the establishment of Islamic 
order is the answer.   
As described in chapter two, the Muslims in the southern Philippines 
steadfastly resisted Spanish, American, and (what they described as) Filipino 
colonizers for most of the last four centuries.  And although the current struggle 
originated over three decades ago in 1972, the call for an Islamic state only came 
a little over two decades ago with the formation and official announcement of the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984.  This, however, is not meant to 
portray the role of Islam as insignificant until this time.  The process of 
Islamization of the Filipino-Muslims in the modern era began as far back as the 
late 1940s, following WWII.  It was during these formative years that a new 
generation of Filipino Muslims experienced an Islamic revival and would go on to 
be the leaders of the original separatist movement.  Middle Eastern Muslims 
taught the Filipinos Islam and the Arabic language in the madrasahs they helped 
erect and more mosques were built to accommodate the increasing number of 
regular observers of religious practices.  The revival was not limited to the 
internal Islamic dynamics of the southern Philippines; it was also a time of 
external interaction with the broader Islamic community worldwide as young men 
began embarking on the hajj and studied at Middle Eastern schools, most 
notably the University of Cairo.  This experience introduced the post-war 
generation to nationalist revolutions and inspired secessionist thinking.142  It also 
accounted for the relationship between the Moro Islamists and Moro nationalists 
who had joined together to form the MNLF (akin to that of the original Muslim 
Brotherhood and nationalist movement in Egypt).  Therefore this “wave” of 
Islamization in the Philippines in the middle of the 20th century was both a 
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domestic experience for the masses as well as a foreign experience of 
immersion into various Middle Eastern societies.  Of crucial importance to this 
point is that the “wave”—although ideologically revolutionary—was not radical.  
Recall during this period the Islamist movements in the Middle East were focused 
on social activism.    
But just as revolutionary ideologies turned increasingly radical throughout 
the Middle East with the passing of time, so it was in the Philippines.  However, 
in 1972 Filipino Muslims—of both secular and Islamic ideology—united out of 
outrage over the seemingly endless cycle of grievances based on discrimination, 
poverty, and inequality mostly linked to the transmigration policies of the 
government and the “land-grabbing” by Christians from the north.  This mass 
outrage resulted in the creation of the MNLF and its’ subsequent declaration of 
war.  In 1976, after nearly four years of heavy fighting against the Republic of the 
Philippines, the MNLF abandoned its demand for independence and settled for 
autonomy by signing the Tripoli Agreement with the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines.  The ill-fated agreement lasted less than a year.  The failure of 
the agreement further exacerbated disunity, mistrust, and divisions already 
present among the top leadership of the movement and in 1984 Hashim 
Salamat, a respected Islamic scholar and one of the original founders of the 
MNLF officially broke off from the MNLF and created the MILF citing the 
movement, under the leadership of Nur Misuari, had grown intolerably secular 
and moderate.143 
Up until this point, the Moro struggle had been represented by the 
MNLF—a militant-nationalist movement.  The MILF, with its emphasis on Islamic 
ideology added a militant-Islamist element to the conflict.  This element of radical 
Islamism was “imported” from the Middle East where it was grounded in the 
legacy of traditionalism.   
3.   Creation of the MILF and ASG 
Hashim Salamat lived in the Middle East (mostly Egypt) from 1959 until 
1970 when he returned to help lead the secessionist movement.  Salamat, highly 
                                            
143 Yegar, 342.   
54 
influenced by the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi, based himself in Pakistan where 
he was “undoubtedly influenced by the military and ideological currents of the 
Afghan jihad.144  With regard to his ideology as the leader of the MILF, he was 
quoted as stating:  “[We want] an Islamic political system and way of life and can 
be achieved through effective Da’wah,145 Tarbiyyah146, and Jihad.”147  This 
ideology of radical Islamic revivalism was accepted and emulated by the 
members of the MILF.  The overall purpose of the MILF was to establish an 
independent Islamic state in the Mindanao region.  His group defined itself in 
terms of Islamic identity and, much like the radical Islamist movements in the 
Middle East, the MILF rallied Muslims against a regime that was secular (albeit 
also a Christian government) who had not only helped dismantle the social and 
political institutions of Islam, but continually worked to counter efforts to rebuild 
them.   
Also like the Middle East, the Filipino Muslims were inspired toward 
radicalization by the global events that demonstrated Muslim strength through 
Islamic revolution.  What had started out as Muslim social activism materialized 
into Moro nationalist movements who challenged the government directly via 
military power, but when the nationalists wavered, it was clear that their agenda 
would not prevent the secular government from continuing to dismantle Islamic 
identity.  The only alternative was to rally Muslims by calling upon the one factor 
they all shared—their Islamic heritage.  Again, this ideology was the fundamental 
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cornerstone of the “call to arms” being propagated by Middle Eastern radical 
Islamists. 
Contemporary radical Islamism was popularized among the Moros of the 
southern Philippines through the mobilization of the MILF who also looked to the 
legacy of traditional Islam to wage an insurgency based on radical ideology and 
militancy.  However, the MILF was not alone in its quest—ideologically—to 
establish an independent Islamic state and return to the fundamentals of Islam.  
As the MNLF pursued a path of demobilization and struggled to implement its 
agreements with the Philippines government while maintaining its public support 
of the Muslims, the MILF continued to fight for recognition and was eventually 
brought to the table by the late-1990s.  However, by 1991 another group, the Abu 
Sayaff Group (ASG) had entered the conflict with a much more radical doctrine.  
They too demanded an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines, but 
they were not willing to recognize or negotiate with the government and in 
addition to their militant activities, they used increasingly violent terrorist tactics.  
The ASG and the MILF were both—albeit to different degrees—radical Islamist 
groups founded as a legacy of Islamic tradition.148   
D.  RADICAL ISLAM IN THE PHILIPPINES:  THE EFFECTS OF 
GLOBALIZATION  
In assessing contemporary radical Islam as a product of globalization, it is 
necessary to define the limits of the scope of this study with regard to the topic of 
globalization.  First, as stated in the opening chapter, for the purposes of this 
thesis, globalization  
…denotes a shift in the special form and extent of human 
organization and interaction to a transcontinental or interregional 
level.  It involves a stretching of social relations across time and 
space such that day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by 
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events happening on the other side of the globe and the practices 
and decisions of highly localized groups and institutions can have 
significant global reverberations.149 
Secondly, although globalization is often associated with economic 
factors, this study also focuses on the social (or more specifically, the 
socioreligious), political and cultural aspects of globalization with regard to states, 
societies, as well as transnational entities.  Thirdly, in discussing the elements of 
traditionalism that linked it to the creation of contemporary radical Islam, the 
discussion inevitably touched on factors related to globalization (i.e. 
internationalization of Islam and transnational elements).  This is an 
understandable point of inquiry and will be addressed later in the chapter, the 
portion of the thesis that analyzes the fusion of globalization and traditionalism.  
Finally, as a point of clarification, the topic of globalization in the context of this 
thesis must also be reiterated.  Although the background of contemporary radical 
Islam was discussed at length in order to establish the roots and process of 
evolution that it endured, the focus of this thesis regards radical Islamism in the 
southern Philippines.  With this in mind, suffice to say an in-depth analysis of the 
impact of globalization on the worldwide Muslim community will not be 
conducted. 
Globalization, as the name implies, has great reach and impact and as 
David Held describes, “…it is best thought of as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon involving diverse domains of activity and interaction including the 
economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural, and environmental.”150  
In addition to this, the effects of globalization should be thought of in both depth 
and expansiveness.   
Contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines as a product of 
globalization occurred indirectly through two avenues; the Philippine state and 
Middle Eastern Muslim societies.  (See Figure 4.)   
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Figure 4.   Radical Islamism and the Effects of Globalization 
 
As diagramed in figure one above, elements of globalization—most 
significantly, cultural imperialism and economic disparity—negatively impacted 
both Muslim societies in the Middle East and the state of the Republic of 
Philippines.151  
First, with regard to the avenue of the Philippines state, the positive effects 
of globalization (growth, stability, development) were temperate at best.  
However, the negative effects were felt throughout the country with little growth 
and development and where they was growth, it was usually extremely 
asymmetrical. Factors such as poor state planning and utilization of resources, 
rampant corruption, as well as weak institutions ill-equipped to deal with the 
negative affects of globalization, prevented the state from developing politically, 
socially, and economically and thereby remaining a weak state.  As one area 
expert assesses;   
…globalization is exacerbating poverty and thereby intensifying the 
[Philippines’] ethnic, religious and socioeconomic divisions. 
Globalization, therefore, is challenging an already premature and 
weak state’s ability to manage its ethnic, socioeconomic and 
religious diversities.152   
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This poor domestic situation, both attributable to (in part) and exacerbated 
by globalization, had devastating impacts on the Filipino Muslims.153  Having 
been systematically marginalized politically, socially, and economically, the 
negative effects of globalization “trickled down” into Muslim society and promoted 
an environment of despair and restlessness that was ripe for radicalism.  A 
logical question stemming from this would be:  But, if globalization did not 
necessarily discriminate regionally, (albeit the Muslim-populated areas are 
among the most impoverished regions154) how could it have caused radical 
Islamism in the south?  This, of course, applies to the notion that not everyone 
who is economically and socially deprived resorts to conflict.  In fact, even within 
the Moro community not all supported the radical Islamist ideology.  So how is it 
then that radical Islamism is a product of globalization?  I posit that the social and 
economic void left by the negative effects of globalization entwined with blatantly 
irresponsible governance was filled by those Middle Eastern entities.  In addition 
to their financial investments in Moro communities they also “exported” their 
revivalist (if not revolutionary) ideology.155  The impact of these successful efforts 
by foreign governments (and later, transnational entities) to socially (and in a 
roundabout way, economically) develop the Muslim regions in the southern 
Philippines cannot be underestimated.  Contemporary radical Islam in the 
southern Philippines is a product of globalization—the void it created opened the 
door to ideological influence and indoctrination.   
A second avenue in which radicalism in the southern Philippines is a 
product of globalization is via Middle Eastern Muslim societies.  As mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter, many of these societies also suffered from the 
                                            
153 For further detail on the social and economic condition of the Muslim Filipino population, 
see Gutierrez. 
154 Ringuet, Daniel J., “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, iss. 1, (April 2002), 33. 
155 Middle Eastern states have, especially since the oil-boom of the 1970s, significantly 
increased the amount of aid provided in the religious realm to Muslim countries throughout 
Southeast Asia.  Specifically, this assistance was in the form of scholarships to universities in the 
Middle East, funding for religious education and institutions and for Muslim religious 
organizations.  “These trends were especially important in countries with Muslim minorities where 
there was relatively little traditional governmental support for Islamic needs.”  Von der Mehden, 
Fred R., Two Worlds of Islam; Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East,” 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 99. 
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negative effects of globalization (such as the threat of cultural imperialism and 
increasing economic deprivation) which provided fuel for Islamic revivalists who 
became increasingly radical in ideology as well as action.  However, the ensuing 
radical Islamist groups in the Middle East, although a product of globalization 
themselves also used globalization to further their cause.  (See Figure 5 below.)  
In this instance, they worked to build a transnational network thereby 
“internationalizing” their movement.  Deeply entangled in this international web 
























Figure 5.   Radical Islamism as a Product of Globalization 
 
Hence, contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines was a 
product of globalization with elements coming from dual sources—the state and 
external transnational entities. 
 
 
                                            
156 The fact that the movements in the southern Philippines have ties with transnational 
radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya is supported and documented in-
depth by scholars such as: Abuza, and Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan. 
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E. RADICAL ISLAM AS A FUSION OF TRADITION AND GLOBALIZATION  
Thus far, the two factors believed to be the cause of radical Islamism have 
been delineated as separate entities—those elements supporting the theory that 
it is a legacy of tradition and those supporting the idea that it is a product of 
globalization.  One of the arguments made in this thesis, however, is that these 
factors are not mutually exclusive but are actually overlapping and entwined—
that is, radical Islamism is a fusion of both factors and one directly includes 
elements of and impacts the other.   
This puts forth the question; in what context is contemporary radical Islam 
a fusion of the legacy on tradition and a product of globalization?  Perhaps more 
aptly put would be to ask in what context is contemporary radical Islam a fusion 
of the legacy of tradition and a product of the phenomenon of globalization.  
Recall in the definition of globalization it is a spatial phenomenon, whereas 
tradition was the basis for the ideology—the message, the process of 
globalization was the medium upon which it was carried and how it allowed for 
the message to spread.  What linked the medium with the message was the 







Figure 6.   Radical Islamism in the Philippines: The Message and the Medium 
 
When discussing the elements of traditionalism linked to the creation of 
contemporary radical Islam, it inevitably touched on factors related to 
globalization—and vice verse.  As stated previously, there were two components 
of globalization and with regard to addressing the issue of fusion both are directly 
applicable.  For the first component—the instance where external entities used 
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globalization to internationalize their movements—there is historical precedence.  
That is, whenever Filipino Muslims underwent a process of Islamization it was 
historically from the “reintroduction of Islam” by outsiders—as it was in the 1940s.  
Filipino Muslims were historically welcoming of their Islamic re-indoctrination by 
Middle Eastern Muslims—whether it was learned domestically or from visiting 
abroad.157  It is along these same lines that radical Islamism in the Philippines 
was introduced and influenced by Middle Eastern ideologists as part of an 
internationalized radical movement rooted in a common understanding of 
traditional Islam.  That is, radical Islam evolved in the southern Philippines with 
an ideology centered on a violent call for the return to traditional Islam, but this 
was not an internally generated phenomenon—it was introduced, supported, and 
perpetuated by external influences.   
Insofar as the second component of globalization—the indirect impact of a 
weak and underdeveloped state—evidence also exists in the historical context 
that fuses it to the concept of radical Islamism as a legacy of tradition.  As 
discussed in detail previously in this chapter the leaders of the MILF and the 
ASG were exposed to extremist ideologies in their travels abroad, and the MILF 
and the ASG were both founded under the banner of establishing an Islamic 
state to bring an end to the substandard status placed upon the Muslims by the 
government of the Philippines.  However, ideology alone was not enough to merit 
a war against the government—the desperate condition of the Muslim population 
in the southern Philippines158 however, which was distinctly drawn down religious 
lines, provided a perfect mixture—though not exclusively due to the negative 
effects globalization had on development of the state. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, contemporary radical Islam as it exists today evolved over a 
span of three decades from a nonviolent social activist movement into a radical 
                                            
157 Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., “Muslim Minority in the Philippines,” (15 April 2004).  Online:  
http://www.bangsamoro.com/bmoro/moro_muslim_minority.php.  Accessed:  March 2006.  This 
paper was presented during the SEACSN Conference 2004: “Issues and Challenges for Peace 
and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia,” in Penang, Malaysia on 12-15 January 2004. 
158 Point of clarification may be required here: this is not to say that the negative effects of 
globalization experienced by the state were the sole reason for the poor condition of the state, 
just that the two factors are related and relevant to the findings. 
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militant fundamentalist one that incorporated an ideology which was conceptually 
counter to the means it is willing to use in achieving its goal.  The elements of 
traditionalism that link it to the creation of contemporary radical Islamism are 
eerily similar with respect to the case of the Muslim struggle in the southern 
Philippines.  In fact, radical Islamism in the Middle East influenced, encouraged 
and supported the radical Islamist component present in the southern Philippines 
conflict today.     
Contemporary radical Islamism was popularized among the “Moros” of the 
southern Philippines through the mobilization of the MILF who also looked to the 
legacy of traditional Islam to wage an insurgency based on radical ideology and 
militancy.  This same radical ideology would also be used later by the ASG to 
justify their means which consisted of increasingly violent terrorist tactics.  
Furthermore radical Islamism is also linked to elements of globalization.  In the 
case of the Philippines, it was a product of globalization with elements coming 
from dual sources—the state and external transnational entities.  These factors, 
far from being mutually exclusive, overlapped and entwined to make radical 




IV. EVOLUTION AND IDEOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY 
RADICAL ISLAM IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Having established that contemporary radical Islam is a fusion of both 
globalization and traditionalism in the previous chapter, the analysis is taken one 
step further in this chapter to exploring the concept of contemporary radical Islam 
in the southern Philippines as an evolving fusion of these causal factors.  That is, 
the evolution of the increasingly militant and radical Muslim separatist groups in 
the Philippines is the focus of this chapter.  It addresses these questions:  To 
what degree did globalization and traditionalism impact the increasingly radical 
separatist movements with regard to ideology, objectives, and tactics?  How did 
elements of these causal factors differ in importance, priority and level of 
influence for each group?  The argument put forth in this chapter is that the role 
and impact of the elements of globalization and tradition differed greatly between 
MILF and ASG.  
In meeting this objective the formative years of the MILF and ASG are 
outlined, specifically addressing the causal factors associated with the 
acceptance and application of radical Islamist ideologies and practices.  Then the 
findings of this diachronic comparative analysis are presented indicating that 
during the formative years of the radical Islamist organization of MILF emerged 
as more of a legacy of tradition than a product of globalization, whereas the ASG 
materialized more as a product of globalization than a legacy of tradition. 
B.  ASSESSMENT OF CAUSAL FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF MILF  
As discussed previously in chapters two and three, the MILF, although not 
officially announced as such until 1984 actually began to take shape following the 
failure of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.  In this section, the formative years of the 
MILF, 1976 to 1984, are chronologically delineated with particular focus on the 
influences of globalization and traditional Islamist ideology.   
In 1969 a group of young revolutionaries met at a training camp in 
Malaysia to organize a movement against the government of the Republic of the 
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Philippines.  Around this same time Hashim Salamat established Nurul Islam, an 
organization promoting Islamic renewal among the Moros.  Salamat was well 
versed in the revivalism being propagated in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.159  He had 
spent the previous eight years studying at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and had 
completed high school in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.  This was certainly not unheard 
of—McKenna asserts that during the period of 1955 to 1978 the Egyptian 
government approved over two hundred scholarships to Moro Muslim students 
as a component of Nasser’s pan-Islamic programs.160   However, it should be 
noted that Salamat, although related to a Congressman, was not from a wealthy 
or prominent family.  Like Misuari he was not an aristocrat, but an ordinary 
Muslim—one that was increasingly becoming more aware of the need for social 
and political change in the Muslim Philippines.  Dissatisfied with the traditional 
elite system, Salamat envisioned himself advocating for reform in the Muslim 
political and religious environment—beginning with the traditional elite.161 
However, he quickly realized there was a more pressing matter, that of defending 
the Muslim community from an unjust and oppressive government and, in 
following this realization, he joined forces with Nur Misuari’s group essentially 
merging his revivalist Islamic ideology with that of revolutionary secular 
nationalists.   
In a matter of five years, however, the unlikely alliance began to crumble.  
By late 1975, after three years of fierce fighting between the MNLF and the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the war had come to a strategic 
stalemate due mostly to the overwhelming number of government troops being 
continuously deployed into the area.162  Realizing this, Nur Misuari, began to 
                                            
159 According to the MILF profile posted at the Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center 
website, Salamat was “…influenced by the writings of the leading theorists of the Islamic state, 
the Eguptian Sayyid Qutb and the Pakistani Abul A’ala Maududi.”  “Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front”, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, (16 February 2006), Online: 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jtic/doc_view_groups.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binde
r/jwit/jwit0277.htm@current&Prod_Name=JTIC&QueryText=&group=Moro+Islamic+Liberation+Fr
ont+(MILF).  Accessed: March 2006.     
160 McKenna, 143.   
161 Ibid, 144.  
162 Rodell, 128. 
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question the reality of attaining the objective of an independent Moro republic.  
This, however, created a fundamental dilemma: “Misuari was forced to change 
not only his own thinking, but he had to convince the rest of the MNLF leadership 
to lower their expectations to a more attainable goal of autonomy within the 
Republic of the Philippines.”163  With his credibility on the line, Misuari pushed 
forth with peace talks which resulted in the establishment of the Tripoli 
Agreement.  This agreement called for a fully autonomous regional government 
of the thirteen provinces of the Mindanao region.  When the agreement failed, the 
rift within the MNLF became profound.  As Rodell describes: “Under Misuari’s 
leadership the MNLF had been a united Moro organization transcending ethnic 
loyalties and supplanting traditional Muslim political leaders.  It was also a 
secular political movement rather than a religious vehicle.”164   
Among the several rival factions brewing, one proved most devastating—
that of former ally and co-founder of the MNLF, Hashim Salamat.  Concerned 
Misuari’s leadership was taking the movement away from its Islamic origins, 
Salamat attempted, in late 1977, to take over the MNLF—a move that was 
reportedly supported by more than half the MNLF leaders.165  Misuari responded 
by branding Salamat a traitor and ejecting him from the front.  Salamat’s 
subsequent departure (along with several other leaders) gravely undermined the 
organization’s ability to function in the long term.  External entities were also 
affected in that the split had left their Middle Eastern supporters divided as well—
while Egypt opted to back Salamat’s group, Libya continued to support Misuari. 
After successfully breaking away from the MNLF, Salamat worked to 
garner more financial, political and social support for his movement.  He 
developed a four-point strategy that included Islamization, self-reliance, political 
organization, and military build-up.166  One of the main strategies of the MILF in 
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(13 October 1995).  Online: 
http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2241_philippines_terror.html.  Accessed: 10 March 
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meeting their Islamist objectives was to revitalize the role of Islam within the 
Moro community and to concurrently build an all encompassing Muslim identity 
as well as Islamic credibility.167  Salamat appealed to the community in several 
ways.  He advocated self-reliance and envisioned and eventually created “…a 
defacto autonomous Islamic community within Philippine territory, with its own 
army, Sharia courts, prisons, and even educational system.”168  Salamat also 
advocated his warriors to show self-restraint and their military tactics would 
consist of orthodox guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks that minimized 
civilian casualties.169   
As he worked to maintain momentum, the challenge of building a military 
branch arose. However, following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there 
was no shortage of “training grounds.”  Beginning in early 1980, Salamat 
dispatched over 600 trainees to receive military training and possibly move on to 
join the Afghanistan Mujahadeen.170   It was from this encounter that the future 
military leaders of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the armed wing of the 
MILF, would gain their experience.  But, perhaps more importantly, a connection 
was made with the men who would later lead Al Qaeda.   
In March 1984, when MILF was officially announced as a new movement 
that would rival the still dominant MNLF, its Islamic characteristics were highly 
emphasized.  
The very name denoted its emphasis on religious values, especially 
the upholding of Sharia law.  Salamat was genuine about this shift 
and was an ustadz (Islamic teacher)…  Under his guidance the 
MILF took on a profoundly religious character as imam (community 
religious leaders) and alim (Islamic scholars) began to play 
prominent roles.171 
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Salamat announced that his group would not only uncompromisingly 
pursue nationalist goals, but that it would also champion instilling traditional 
Islamic values and teachings.  He declared his movement would be ideologically 
different from the MNLF:  
[S]ome personalities in the revolution advocate the idea that the 
sole and singular objective in our struggle is simply to liberate our 
homeland, giving no importance to the system of government that 
shall be established.  (We want) an Islamic political system and 
way of life and can be achieved through effective Da’wah, 
Tarbiyyah, and jihad.172   
To this end, the MILF came to exist as a radical Islamist separatist 
movement.  In less than a decade it would grow to be the largest and most 
popularly supported movement in the region, even crossing the ever-tenuous 
ethno-linguistic barriers.  Its identity was firmly rooted in the religious background 
of its leaders.   
During its formative years MILF was characterized by a high propensity to 
look to traditionalism in building its ideology.  The influence of Hashim Salamat 
and his devotion to the principles of traditional Islam are a direct reflection of this 
as it is also indicative in the declared objectives of the group: 
 To make supreme the Word of Allah.  To gain the pleasure of 
Allah.  To strengthen the relationship of man with his creator.  To 
strengthen the relationship of man and man.  To regain the illegally 
and immorally usurped legitimate and inalienable rights of the 
Bangsamoro people to freedom and self-determination.  To 
establish an independent state and government and implement 
Shari’ah (Islamic law).173 
 
Furthermore, the importance of this fundamental component of religious 
identity is reflected in the fact that the group’s members “…highlight the centrality 
of their Islamic faith to their national identity.”174   
                                            
172 Tiglao, 25. 
173 “Interview with MILF Leader Sheikh Salamat Hashim,” Nida’ul Islam, issue 23, (April-May 
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On the other hand, globalization also seemingly played a role in creating 
the radical Islamist character of the MILF since the group was also indoctrinated 
in the global effects of jihad through its involvement in the Afghanistan conflict.  
However, the argument here is that the MILFs involvement in that conflict did not 
divert attention away from the primary concerns within their homeland.  That is, 
while the MILF did in fact send trainees only about 30 percent actually joined the 
mujahidin.175 The others returned to the Philippines upon completion of their 
training.  During the MILFs formative years—although they actively solicited 
support in the form of resources, they only had limited engagements with 
external entities—to this day the group maintains its objectives are limited to 
addressing the problems of the Bangsamoro. 
The acceptance and application of radical Islamist theories and practices 
during the formative years of MILF was caused more by factors associated with 
traditionalism than those associated with globalization.   That is, the radical 
Islamist organization of MILF was more a legacy of tradition than a product of 
globalization.  The message (tradition) was the focal point of this group and 
responsible for launching the group whereas the medium (globalization) played 
the role of sustainment.   
C. ASSESSMENT OF CAUSAL FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF ASG  
The Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword) broke off from the MNLF in 1991 
claiming disagreement with the ongoing peace process, but its truly formative 
years were from 1989 to about 1995.176   In this section, these formative years of 
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are chronologically delineated with particular focus 
on the influences of globalization and traditional Islamist ideology.   
The ASG stated its main purpose as being the establishment of an Islamic 
state, based on Islamic law (Shariah).  One author analyzed the emergence of 
ASG as an important shift within the Muslim Nationalist movement: 
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176 This period was chosen as the “formative years” of the ASG due to the fact that 1989 
marked the year ASG first began to form and 1995 is viewed as a turning point for the group with 
regard to capability.  (In December 1994 the group took responsibility for bombing an 
international flight and in April 1995 they ambushed the town of Ipil killing 54 people.) 
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It represents a process towards the Islamization of the Moro identity 
and the formalization of the already existing Islamic trend within the 
MNLF.  The nationalist essence of the MNLF was incorporated into 
the Abu Sayyaf’s protracted struggle for Islamization of the Moro 
community, entailing operational transformation of the movement.  
…Abu Sayyaf rejects the practice of the complementary non-violent 
mobilization (dawa) since violent struggle (Jihad) corresponds to 
the group’s ideological strategy, while moderation of the struggle 
constitutes an inevitable acceptance of the MNLFs concessions to 
the State.177    
The onset of ASG meant the full-fledged radicalization of the Moro 
movement.  Abu Sayyaf was, like the majority of MNLF, Tausug, and didn’t break 
off due to longstanding tribal differences, nor was it class differences—both 
group leaders were from “commoner” backgrounds.  In fact, Abu Sayyaf 
represented a “blend” of both MNLF and MILF—ethno-linguistically similar to the 
MNLF, but ideologically closer to MILF.  The leader of the group, Abdurazzak 
Abubakar Janjalani, shared some similarities with Salamat:  They both received 
scholarships and were religiously educated in the Middle East (although Janjalani 
received his education in Wahhabist Saudi Arabia) and espoused adherence to 
traditional practices.178  They were both also involved in the war in Afghanistan.  
They were also eventually funded by various Middle Eastern states and Al 
Qaeda.  However, within these similarities lie cavernous differences—mostly 
relating to Janjalani’s propensity for extremism.   
Janjalani’s extremist ideology regarding Islamic traditionalism is best 
reflected in the objective of the ASG.  Like the MILF, the ASG looks to establish 
an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines, however, while MILF 
stops there, the ASG is much more radical in its purpose: 
[T]he Abu Sayyaf additionally espouses violent religious 
intolerance, advocating the deliberate targeting of all southern 
Filipino Catholics.  Abu Sayyaf also sees its objectives in Mindanao 
as intimately tied to an integrated effort aimed at asserting the 
global dominance of Islam through armed struggle and an extreme 
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religious fervor not generally shared (at least overtly) by the 
MILF.179   
As previously mentioned, the MILF did send trainees to Afghanistan, and 
some did go on to become part of the Mujahadin.  However, the level in which 
this experience directed MILF ideology was far less “intimate” than for the ASG.  
In fact, some scholars look to this “intensive involvement in the Afghan war” by 
the ASG as accounting for the violent legacy of the Abu Sayyaf.180  This is further 
supported in the fact that aside from being educated in Saudi Arabia, during his 
experience in Pakistan, Janjalani received training at a camp that was overseen 
by a professor of Wahhabist Islam whose strict interpretations were appreciated 
by many wealthy Saudis, including Osama bin Laden.181  Later, Janjalani, in 
honor of this mentor, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, would name his movement after 
him.   
Hence, the experience in Afghanistan undoubtedly contributed to the 
extreme Jihadist views of Janjalani, however, it was also where he developed a 
close relationship with future key players of Al Qaeda.  Bin Laden seems to have 
taken a keen personal interest in Janjalani’s aspirations to establish a breakaway 
group in the Philippines.  As one author states:  “Janjalani is said to have met 
with bin Laden in Afghanistan and been encouraged by him to form a violent 
breakaway splinter group in the southern Philippines when he returned to the 
Philippines from the jihad.”182  Zachary Abuza attributes this “encouragement” on 
the part of bin Laden to be for the purposes of expanding his own Al Qaeda 
network which he formed in 1988.183  “The cell,” Abuza states, “would also be an 
important base of support for terrorist operations.”184  Again, ties to Al Qaeda 
were made to the MILF, however, existing evidence suggests these ties were 
                                            
179 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of 
Southeast Asia, (Arlington, Virginia: RAND, 2001), 89-90. 
180 Ibid, 91. 
181 Abuza, 100. 
182 Williams, Clive M. G., “The Question of “Links” Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia,” 
in Ramakrishna and Tan, 87-88. 
183 Abuza, 100. 
184 Ibid. 
71 
limited to a shared superficial belief in the cause (basically the need for an 
Islamist movement), but more important to the MILF was financial support and 
mutual access to training camps.185  Once the ASG was established, Ramzi 
Yousuf, an al Qaeda operative, was dispatched in 1993 to the southern 
Philippines to plan and launch multiple international terrorist attacks and train 
members of the group.186  Under Yousef’s tutelage, the ASG embarked on an 
international as well as domestic terrorist campaign. 
In summary, the ASG and the MILF share some fundamental similarities; 
however, the evolution of the ASG was heavily influenced by radical 
transnational entities.  That is, although grounded in traditional Islamist values, 
the group was profoundly involved and even encouraged by transnational 
entities—which is where its identity is seemingly firmly rooted.  During its 
formative years MILF was characterized by a high propensity to accept the 
extremist doctrine of these foreign entities in building its ideology.  Although 
certainly the ideology of the ASG is centered around traditionalism, the global 
effects of jihad and the experiences of its leaders involved in the Afghanistan 
conflict were a much more significant determinant of the “brand” of contemporary 
radical Islam accepted and upheld by the ASG.  The acceptance and application 
of radical Islamist theories and practices during the formative years of ASG were 
caused more by factors associated with globalization, in the sense that these 
transnational entities, not only a product of globalization themselves, but using 
globalization to further their cause, than those associated with traditionalism.  
That is, the radical Islamist organization of ASG was more a product of 
globalization than a legacy of tradition.  The message (tradition), although highly 
touted and extremist, was not the focal point—in fact, it seems it was more 
commonly used in a rhetorical sense to energize the movement.  Certainly 
radical Islamist ideologies are epitomized as a legacy of tradition, but for the 
ASG, the medium (globalization) played the most significant role in launching and 
developing the group.     
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D.   FINDINGS OF DIACHRONIC COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
Recall that in the previous chapter it was argued radical Islamism in the 
southern Philippines is a fusion of factors associated with tradition and 
globalization.  Furthermore, two avenues of globalization were attributable to 
radical Islamism.  The first was indirect economic impacts resulting in a weak 
state and the second was transnational networks.  Based on these findings, the 
proposed model was that tradition was the basis for the ideology—the message, 
and the process of globalization was the medium upon which it was carried, how 
it allowed for the message to spread.  What linked them together was the 




Figure 7.   Contemporary radical Islam in the Philippines: A Fusion of Factors 
 
In this chapter the concept of contemporary radical Islam—as it exists in 
the case of the Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines—was 
explored as an evolving fusion of the causal factors of traditionalism and 
globalization.  In doing so, a diachronic comparative analysis was conducted in 
the previous two sections where the formative years of the MILF (1976 – 1984) 
and the ASG (1989-1995) were evaluated in terms of which, if either, causal 
factor played a significantly greater role in creating each radical Islamist 
movement.  The chronology of events that occurred during the formative years of 
each group indicated that the MILF was based significantly more on 
traditionalism whereas the ASG seemingly leaned toward factors associated with 
globalization.  (See figure 8.)   
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Figure 8.   Contemporary Radical Islamism in the Philippines:  An Evolution of 
Causal Factors 
 
The method of diachronic comparative analysis was chosen in conducting 
this study in order to explain the different outcomes in a single state, the 
Philippines, of a conflict that has spanned over three decades with its propensity 
towards increased radical ideologies and level of violence.  What accounts for 
the evolution of a Islamist separatist movement—in the same state, and under 
basically the same political, social, and economic conditions—from an Islamic 
nationalist militant one to a violent call for Islamization (including religious 
intolerance) and the establishment of a pan-Islamic state?  In conducting the 
analysis each groups ideologies, objectives, and tactics were evaluated.  The 
following are the findings based on the research. 
With regard to the ideologies of each group, they have essentially the 
same level of influence from the causal factors.  That is, the ideological basis for 
the MILF (IM) and that of the ASG (IA) were not more significantly influenced by 
either of the two factors.  The difference that is shown is reflective of the ASG’s 
propensity for violence (international and sectarian).  Moreover, as established in 
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the previous chapter, and shown in the figures above, the ideology is what 











Figure 9.   Ideology of the MILF and ASG 
 
When assessing the question of objectives, the two groups begin to differ.  
Whereas the objectives of the MILF (OM) show very little change since their 
objective is to establish a separate Islamic state, but there is an increased level 
of globalization due to the fact that the objectives are a response to addressing 
the negative indirect effects of globalization.  As for the objectives of the ASG 
(OA), the call for a pan-Islamic state is less from traditional factors and more from 













Figure 10.   Ideology and Objectives of the MILF and ASG 
 
Finally, the most extreme difference appears when evaluating the groups’ 
tactics.  For the MILF, their tactics are more traditional.  As discussed previously, 
the MILF—although occasionally conducting terrorist attacks—typically adhere to 
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guerilla warfare operations indicative of a militant group.  The ASG’s tactics on 
the other hand have been condemned (at least outwardly) by not only both the 
MNLF and the MILF, but by other Muslim nations.  Additionally, their tactics are 















Figure 11.   Ideology, Objectives, and Tactics of MILF and ASG 
 
In summary, the MILF tends to be influenced slightly more by traditional 
factors, while being consistently influenced at the same level by factors related to 
globalization.  The ASG, however, seems to be increasingly influenced by factors 
associated to globalization—especially in its objectives and tactics.  (See figure 















Figure 12.   Influential factors of the MILF and ASG 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Although the MILF and ASG are both radical Islamist organizations and 
are consequences of a legacy of traditional Islam and a product of globalization, 
they differ significantly as to the level of influence and relevance experienced by 
each group during their formative years.  Essentially, the MILF was more 
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representative of the legacy of traditional Islam whereas the ASG, on the other 
hand, was much more a product of globalization.  In assessing the comparative 
diachronic analysis, the following conclusions were drawn:  (1) Contemporary 
radical Islam is an evolving fusion of factors associated with tradition and 
globalization.  (2)  This evolution went from a time when traditional legacies were 
the dominant causal factor of radical Islamism to one where it is decidedly more 
a product of globalization.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS TO U.S. POLICY  
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis focused on the protracted radical Islamist separatist 
movements in the southern Philippines.  The debate surrounding the question of 
causal factors which account for the rise of radical Islamist movements was 
assessed.  These debates, which were analyzed from a global, regional and 
country perspective, fell into two schools of thought:  those who view the causal 
factors of contemporary radical Islam as being a legacy of tradition and those 
who contend it is a product of globalization.    The argument posited here 
however, was that not only was contemporary radical Islamism a fusion of 
globalization and traditionalism, but it was also evolving.  Therefore, the purpose 
of this thesis was to conduct an in-depth analysis of the root causes and the role 
of Islam using a diachronic comparative analysis.   
The first area examined in this these was the background of the origins of 
Islam in Southeast Asia and more specifically in the Philippines and the role of 
Islam in the anti-colonial struggle against the Spaniards and Americans as well 
as the factors that led to organized Muslim rebellion some three decades ago.  
The conclusions drawn from this analysis were two-fold.  First, the peaceful way 
in which Islam was introduced, accepted, and adopted by many Southeast 
Asians facilitated the spread of Islam throughout the region; however, its greatest 
period of expansion was during the colonial era when Islam became the rallying 
call against the Christianity proselytizing invaders.  Perhaps the most epic 
example of this was the three century-long conflict between the Spanish and the 
Muslims in the Philippines which came to be known as the Moro Wars.  During 
these wars—although rarely uniting as one—vast ethnolinguistic communities 
rallied in the name of Islam to fend off their common enemy.  It wasn’t until the 
Americans took control from the Spanish that the entire region was finally 
colonized.  Second, the greatest legacy of the Americans was the fact that in a 
matter of decades the Americans managed to dismantle the institutions the 
Muslims had fought so hard to preserve.  Two decades after the Americans left 
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an independent Republic of the Philippines in 1946, the Muslim regions, still 
unable to rebuild their traditional institutions compounded by the fact that they 
were being increasingly marginalized by the majority Christian state, once again 
engaged in conflict—except this time it was the “Filipino foreigners” the were 
fighting.  For the first time, however, the Muslims organized a movement that 
effectively represented the “Moro Nation”—the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front. 
Next the causal factors of contemporary radical Islam in the southern 
Philippines—traditionalism and globalization—were examined.  A distinct 
evolutionary pattern became evident in chronologically outlining the evolution of 
radical Islamism from its beginnings as an anti-nationalist movement in the 
Middle East during the mid-twentieth century to what is known world-wide today 
as contemporary radical Islam.  Within a span of three decades, Islamic 
revivalism, which called for nonviolent social activism, had evolved into radical 
militant fundamentalism with an ideology that is conceptually counter to the 
means it is willing to use in achieving its goal.  Stated bluntly, radical Islamism 
today evolved from activists calling to address the problem of a perceived Muslim 
community in crisis—or more specifically, an identity crisis.  The solutions to 
these problems were seen as having to come from within the Muslim community 
through social and political reformation centered on traditional Islamic practices 
and beliefs.  Islamization of society (socio-religious indoctrination) through 
peaceful activism was of the highest priority.   
However, this objective suffered significant setbacks as nationalist 
movements increasingly dominated the political arena.  Although ideal in the 
sense that the two movements shared common ground in that their main purpose 
was to free Muslims form foreign control, the nationalists’ secular ideologies 
proved detrimental to the Islamic revivalist movement.  Hence, as the nationalists 
gained political power and social influence they increasingly marginalized the role 
of the religion.   
The most profound example of this occurrence was in Egypt where 
revivalist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood were outlawed and its 
leaders were arrested, imprisoned, exiled and executed.  The brutal suppression 
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of these revivalist movements by the Egyptian secular government would result 
in scholars such as Sayyid Qutb viewing nationalist governments as being no 
different than the governments they had supported the overthrow of.  
Furthermore, implanted in his embittered reaction was the conclusion that the 
secularists could not be reasoned with—only forcibly removed.   
As it were, many nationalist governments—having failed to establish 
vibrant and viable economic, political, and social development models—lost 
legitimacy and the militant call to overthrow these “ungodly” regimes gained 
momentum throughout the 1970s.  As the radical ideology of the Islamists gained 
popularity, watershed world events such as the “October War,” the Saudi Arabian 
oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan 
emboldened the spirit of the movements.  Additionally, political and religious 
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia prompted both to export their revolutionary 
ideologies.  These conditions facilitated the development of contemporary radical 
Islam and it was under this context that the causes of contemporary radical Islam 
in the southern Philippines were examined. 
In presenting the argument that contemporary radical Islamism in the 
southern Philippines was a legacy of tradition, one critical clarification needed to 
be explained:  Radical Islamism in the Philippines was not a legacy of tradition 
based on Moro Islamic traditionalism, but rather a legacy based on Middle 
Eastern Islamic traditionalism.  Radical Islamism was viewed by its propagators 
as the “righteous vanguard” striving to correct a society gone astray.187  The 
movement was driven by the conviction that Jihad was a Muslim responsibility 
and the only means to establishing the new Islamic order.  The Islamists believed 
they were fulfilling the divine commandment of establishing an Islamic 
government.  Along this same line, the ideology of the radical Islamists was 
further supported (in their view) in the founding of Islam—they equated the plight 
of Islam in modern times with that of the days of the Prophet when he triumphed 
over the jahiliyya188 and created his Islamic state.189   
                                            
187 Esposito, Islam, 259. 
188 Jahillyya is the barbarism and ignorance that preceded the coming of Islam in Arabia.  
See Burke, 329. 
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Whether prevailing over the jahillyya or conducting a Jihad, it is clear that 
the ideological inspiration of contemporary radical Islam is firmly rooted in the 
legacy of traditional Islam.  This ideological inspiration was also embraced by 
Muslim Filipinos.  That is, radical Islamism in the Middle East was a legacy of 
tradition and those radical Islamist movements influenced, encouraged and 
supported the radical Islamist component present in the southern Philippines 
conflict today.  Hence, radical Islamism in the Philippines was a legacy of 
tradition through the Middle East.  Significant differences between the plight of 
Middle Eastern and Filipino Muslim societies exist and are quite evident—
especially those surrounding the question of minority status, the overall objective 
(separating verses overthrowing the government), and the current view of society 
(gone astray verses need to unify). Athough these conditions made each society 
ripe for revolution, they were contextual differences not ideological.  That is, the 
core of the radical Islamist ideology was firmly rooted in and applicable to both 
groups because they both viewed themselves as the righteous vanguard and 
wholeheartedly accepted the establishment of Islamic order as the answer to 
their problems.   
In the Philippines, two major radical Islamist groups splintered off from the 
original MNLF—the MILF in 1984 and the ASG in 1991.  The focal point of the 
MILF’s Islamist ideology can be traced to its founder Hashim Salamat.  Salamat, 
having been educated in Egypt, was highly influenced by the Islamist ideology 
being espoused by the movement’s most prestigious scholars such as Qutb and 
Mawdudi.  The overall objective of the MILF was to establish an independent 
Islamic state in the Mindanao region.  This group defined itself in terms of Islamic 
identity and, much like the radical Islamist movements in the Middle East, the 
MILF rallied Muslims against a regime that was secular (albeit also a Christian 
government) who had not only helped dismantle the social and political 
institutions of Islam, but continually worked to counter efforts to rebuild them.   
Also like the Middle East, the Filipino Muslims were inspired by the global 
events which demonstrated Muslim strength through Islamic revolution.  What 
                                            
189 Kepel, 31.   
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had started out as Muslim social activism materialized into Moro nationalist 
movements which challenged the government directly via military power.  
However, when the nationalists wavered (settled for autonomy over secession), it 
became clear their agenda would not prevent the secular government from 
continuing to dismantle the Islamic identity of the Muslim Filipinos.  Therefore, 
the only alternative for the MILF was to rally Muslims by calling upon the one 
factor they all shared—their Islamic heritage.  This ideology was the fundamental 
cornerstone of the “call to arms” being propagated by Middle Eastern radical 
Islamists.  The MILF was not alone in its view—ideologically—to establish an 
independent Islamic state and return to the fundamentals of Islam.  In 1991 the 
ASG entered the conflict with a much more radical doctrine.  The ASG differed 
from the MILF in that their leaders were indoctrinated in radical Islamism in 
Afghanistan (and Pakistan) following the Soviet invasion.  Despite these different 
circumstances, both were—albeit to different degrees—radical Islamist groups 
founded as a legacy of Islamic traditionalism. 
Demonstrating that contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines 
was also a product of globalization, the two avenues in which this occurred were 
explained: through the Philippine state and through external transnational 
entities.  With respect to the Philippine state, factors such as poor state planning 
and utilization of resources, rampant corruption, as well as weak institutions ill-
equipped to deal with the negative affects of globalization, prevented the state 
from developing politically, socially, and economically and thereby remaining a 
weak state.  This weak state, in-turn, further exacerbated by the negative effects 
of globalization, “trickled down” into Muslim society and promoted an 
environment of despair and restlessness that was ripe for radicalism.   
It wasn’t these negative effects alone which caused the movements to 
radicalize; rather, the negative effects of globalization entwined with blatantly 
irresponsible governance had resulted in a social and economic void.  This void 
was, in time, filled by those Middle Eastern entities with radical Islamist 
ideologies.  Subsequently, their financial investments in Moro communities also 
“exported” their revivalist (if not revolutionary) ideology.  Therefore, in this sense, 
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contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines became a product of 
globalization—the void it created opened the door to ideological influence and 
indoctrination of Muslim Filipinos. 
The second avenue with regard to the topic of globalization was via Middle 
Eastern Muslim societies.  The ensuing radical Islamist groups in the Middle 
East, having suffered from the negative effects of globalization themselves, were 
not only a product of globalization but also used globalization to further their 
cause.  In this particular instance, they worked to build a transnational network 
thereby “internationalizing” their movement which eventually expanded into the 
Philippines.   
After presenting the evidence advocating both globalization and 
traditionalism as causes of radical Islamism in the southern Philippines—this 
thesis argued that they these factors were not mutually exclusive.  The MILF 
looked to the legacy of traditional Islam to wage an insurgency based on radical 
ideology and militancy.  This same radical ideology would also be used later by 
the ASG to justify their means which consisted of increasingly violent terrorist 
tactics.  Furthermore, in the case of the Philippines, it was a product of 
globalization.  These factors, far from being mutually exclusive, overlapped and 
entwined to make radical Islamism a fusion of both factors.  Therefore, whereas 
tradition was the basis for the ideology—the message, the process of 
globalization was the medium upon which it was carried and how it allowed for 
the message to spread.  What linked the medium with the message was the 
ideology.   
Finally, the idea that the concept of radical Islamism is an evolving fusion 
of these causal factors was explored.  Upon conducting a diachronic comparative 
analysis of the formative years of the MILF and the ASG, the evidence 
conclusively indicates this to be so.  That is, although the MILF and ASG were 
both radical Islamist organizations and were consequences of both a legacy of 
traditional Islam and a product of globalization, they differed significantly as to the 
level of influence and relevance experienced by each group.  During its formative 
years (1976 to 1984) the MILF was characterized by a high propensity to look to 
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traditionalism in building its ideology.  The influence of Hashim Salamat and his 
devotion to the principles of traditional Islam are a direct reflection of this.  
However, globalization also influenced the creation of the radical Islamist 
character of the MILF.  The MILF was undoubtedly indoctrinated (and even 
participated) in the global jihad and also actively solicited support in the form of 
resources; however, it was never at the expense of the movement against the 
Philippine government and they remained focused on their objective of 
addressing the problems of the Bangsamoro.  For the MILF the message 
(tradition) was the focal point of the movement and was responsible for launching 
them whereas the medium (globalization) played the role (albeit important) of 
sustainment.   
The ASG, conversely, although sharing the same traditional Islamist 
ideology, was heavily influenced by radical transnational entities.  That is, 
although grounded in traditional Islamist values, the group was profoundly 
involved in and even encouraged by transnational entities—which is where its 
identity is seemingly firmly rooted.  The ideology of the ASG is centered around 
traditionalism, but the global effects of jihad and the experiences of its leaders 
involved in the Afghanistan conflict were a much more significant determinant as 
to the “brand” of contemporary radical Islam accepted and upheld by the ASG.  
For the ASG, the message (tradition), although highly touted and extremist, was 
not the focal point, it was in fact the medium (globalization) that played the most 
significant role in launching and developing the group.  Essentially, in assessing 
each group’s ideology, objectives, and tactics, it becomes evident that the MILF 
was more representative of the legacy of traditional Islam whereas the ASG was 
much more a product of globalization.   
 
 
B.  U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As previously stated, this thesis has importance at both the global and 
country-specific levels.  First, with regard to the Global War on Terrorism, it 
explored the seemingly neglected portion of the 9/11 Commission recommended 
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strategy in combating Islamic terrorism:  to counter the rise of radical ideologies 
within the Islamic world that inspire terrorism.  At the country-specific level, the 
fact that the United States has dramatically enhanced its relationship with the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R.P.) since the 9/11 attacks is 
also of importance.  The two governments have continued to work closely in 
support of the G.R.P.’s domestic war on terrorism and the U.S. government has 
dedicated a significant amount of resources to combat this threat.   
This thesis argued that understanding the origins and causes of radical 
Islamism was critical to countering the rise of radical Islamist ideologies and 
thereby was critical to countering terrorism.  Simply stated using a concept as 
nebulous as ideology, if its past is known then there will be a better 
understanding of its future—at least more so than only understanding it in the 
context of what it is today. 
Understanding the importance of the role of ideology in determining the 
actions of a threatening entity would provide an immeasurable advantage to 
policymakers.  The purpose of the case study on the conflict in the southern 
Philippines was to demonstrate this importance.  A tendency exists among U.S. 
policymakers to view ideology as a mere “rallying cry,” separate from the causal 
factors.  However, the case study of the Philippines clearly shows an instance in 
which the various causal factors of radical Islamism were not separate unrelated 
entities, but rather a fusion of factors relating to traditionalism and globalization 
entwined and interrelated and linked through ideology.   
A second implication of understanding and correctly assessing the causes 
and role of contemporary radical Islam as it applies to the separatist movements 
in the southern Philippines conflict is that the U.S. has a unique opportunity to 
use it to improve relations with Muslims across the globe.  Although the 
relationship forged with the Philippines government is tenuous at times and 
accounts for a certain level of controversy over the level of U.S. involvement in 
fighting the Muslim rebels, the Muslim population is seemingly less hostile to U.S. 
involvement--at least less so than most other Muslim populations across the 
globe.  Possessing a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of “radical 
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Islamism” and basing policy on it will persuade more moderate Muslims around 
the world to reconsider their opinion of the U.S.  This improved U.S. image would 
certainly create a more open and amenable environment for exchanges and 
thereby work toward stifling radical Islamist movements as well as countering the 
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